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Reasons as defaults / John F. Horty.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Horty, John, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Reason.
Rationalism.
Explanation.
Justification (Theory of knowledge).
Reasoning.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xv, 256 pages) : illustrations
Place of Publication:
New York : Oxford University Press, 2012.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Although the study of reasons plays an important role in both epistemology and moral philosophy, little attention has been devoted to the question of how, exactly, reasons interact to support the actions or conclusions they do. In this book, John F. Horty attempts to answer this question by providing a precise, concrete account of reasons and their interaction, based on the logic of default reasoning. The book begins with an intuitive, accessible introduction to default logic itself, and then argues that this logic can be adapted to serve as a foundation for a concrete theory of reasons. Horty
Contents:
Introduction; I: Default logic; 1 A primer on default logic; 1.1 Basic concepts; 1.2 Central definitions; 1.3 Extensions and conclusions; 2 From defaults to reasons; 2.1 An austere theory of reasons; 2.2 Developing the theory; II: Deontic logic; 3 Reasons and oughts; 3.1 The two logics; 3.2 Properties of the logics; 4 Moral conflicts; 4.1 Logical objections; 4.2 Conceptual objections; 4.3 Objections based on reasons as moral forces; III: Some elaborations; 5 Variable priorities and exclusion; 5.1 Variable priority default theories; 5.2 Exclusionary default theories
5.3 Discussion; 6 Particularism; 6.1 Dancy's argument; 6.2 Evaluating the argument; 6.3 Discussion; IV: Some complications; 7 Skepticism and floating conclusions; 7.1 Floating conclusions; 7.2 The problem with floating conclusions; 7.3 Discussion; 8 Problems with priorities; 8.1 Refining the concept of defeat; 8.2 Controlling the order of application; 8.3 Discussion; V: Appendices; A: Notes on the default logics; A.1 Proper scenarios; A.2 Some observations on defeat; A.3 Normal default theories; B: Notes on the deontic logics; B.1 A comparison with van Fraassen's logic; B.2 A comparison with standard deontic logic.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
0-19-939644-2
1-280-59387-3
9786613623706
0-19-990966-0
OCLC:
781629354

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