The sources of intentionality / Uriah Kriegel.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kriegel, Uriah, author.

Series:

Philosophy of mind series.

Philosophy of mind

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Intentionality (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xiv, 271 pages).

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

What do paintings, thoughts, words, desires, photographs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not.

Contents:

1 The Experiential Origins of Intentionality 9

1.1 The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances 10

1.1.1 The Anchoring-Instance Model of Concept Formation 10

1.1.2 Application to the Concept of Intentionality 19

1.2 Experiential Intentionality the Anchor 25

1.2.1 An Asymmetry of Ascription 26

1.2.2 Explaining the Asymmetry 29

1.2.3 Objections and Replies 38

1.3 "Experiential Intentionality" 43

1.3.1 Definition 43

1.3.2 Existence 46

1.3.3 Scope 47

2 The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I.A Higher-Order Tracking Theory 67

2.1 A Tracking Theory of Experiential Intentionality? 68

2.1.1 Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation 69

2.1.2 Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience 73

2.1.3 Experiential Tracking 79

2.2 The HOT Argument 83

2.2.1 Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience 83

2.2.2 Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality 87

2.3 Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking 94

2.4 Objections and Replies 100

2.4.1 "Intentionality," "Representation," "Tracking" 100

2.4.2 "What Do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for? 104

3 The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory 125

3.1 Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference 125

3.2 The Argument from Intentional Indifference 127

3.2.1 The Argument 127

3.2.2 Responses 132

3.2.3 Brains in Vats 137

3.3 The Argument from Intentional Inexistence 138

3.3.1 The Argument 138

3.3.2 Responses 144

3.4 Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification 150

3.5 Objections to Adverbialism 1591

4 The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory 189

4.1 Potentialism 190

4.2 Inferentialism 194

4.3 Eliminativism 198

4.4 Interpretivism 200

4.4.1 Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality 201

4.4.2 Interpretivism Developed 206

4.4.3 Objections and Replies 213

5 Toward a General Theory of Intentionality 229

5.1 Adverbialism plus Interpretivism 231

5.2 Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism 240.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [257]-268) and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-938031-7

1-283-42336-7

9786613423368

0-19-987666-5

OCLC:

847901105