The sources of intentionality / Uriah Kriegel.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kriegel, Uriah.

Series:

Philosophy of mind series.

Philosophy of mind

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Intentionality (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (286 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, c2011.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

What do paintings, thoughts, words, desires, photographs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not.

Contents:

""Cover""; ""Contents""; ""Analytical Table of Contents""; ""Introduction""; ""1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality""; ""1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances""; ""1.1.1. The Anchoring-Instance Model of Concept Formation""; ""1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality""; ""1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor""; ""1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription""; ""1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry""; ""1.2.3. Objections and Replies""; ""1.3. “Experiential Intentionality�""; ""1.3.1. Definition""; ""1.3.2. Existence""; ""1.3.3. Scope""

""2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory""""2.1. A Tracking Theory of Experiential Intentionality?""; ""2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation""; ""2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience""; ""2.1.3. Experiential Tracking""; ""2.2. The HOT Argument""; ""2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience""; ""2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality""; ""2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking""; ""2.4. Objections and Replies""

""2.4.1. “Intentionality,� “Representation,� “Tracking�""""2.4.2. What Do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for?""; ""3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory""; ""3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference""; ""3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference""; ""3.2.1. The Argument""; ""3.2.2. Responses""; ""3.2.3. Brains in Vats""; ""3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence""; ""3.3.1. The Argument""; ""3.3.2. Responses""; ""3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification""

""3.5. Objections to Adverbialism""""4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory""; ""4.1. Potentialism""; ""4.2. Inferentialism""; ""4.3. Eliminativism""; ""4.4. Interpretivism""; ""4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality""; ""4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed""; ""4.4.3. Objections and Replies""; ""5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality""; ""5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism""; ""5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism""; ""References""; ""Index""; ""A""; ""B""; ""C""; ""D""; ""E""; ""F""; ""G""; ""H""; ""I""; ""J""

""K""""L""; ""M""; ""P""; ""Q""; ""R""; ""S""; ""T""; ""Z""

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Description based on print version record.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [257]-268) and index.

ISBN:

0-19-938031-7

1-283-42336-7

9786613423368

0-19-987666-5

OCLC:

847901105