Humean nature : how desire explains action, thought, and feeling / Neil Sinhababu.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sinhababu, Neil, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Hume, David, 1711-1776.

Hume, David.

Motivation (Psychology)--Philosophy.

Motivation (Psychology).

Desire (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (ix, 214 pages) : illustrations

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

How desire explains action, thought, and feeling

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.

Summary:

Neil Sinhababu defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all human action and practical reasoning. This theory helps us to understand core aspects of human nature, such as intention, the will, moral belief, emotion, and the self; and it has revolutionary consequences for ethics.

Contents:

Machine generated contents note: 1. Return of the Humean Theory

1.1. Humean Theory of Motivation

1.2. Smith's Puzzle and his Treachery

1.3. Anti-Humean Views

1.4. Developing a Psychological Theory

1.5. Rest of this Book

2. Five Properties of Desire

2.1. Motivational Aspect

2.2. Hedonic Aspect

2.3. Attentional Aspect

2.4. Amplification by Vividness

2.5. Desire

Belief Theory of Reasoning

3. Desire and Pleasure

3.1. Feeling of Obligation

3.2. Darwall and Desires Formed in Deliberation

3.3. Bromwich and Saying What You Believe

3.4. Doring and Actions Expressing Emotion

3.5. Hedonic Correlation

4. Moral Judgment

4.1. Emotional Perception Model

4.2. Metaethics of Emotional Perception

4.3. Color Analogy

4.4. Experimental Evidence: Smells, Dumbfounding, and Psychopathy

4.5. Experientialism, Not Internalism, about Morality

5. Desire and Attention

5.1. Schueler and Combining Premises in Reasoning

5.2. Smith and the Explanation of Reasoning

5.3. Setiya, Practical Knowledge, and Belief about Doing

5.4. Shah and Velleman on Transparency in Deliberation

5.5. Towards a Theory of Daydreams

6. Intention

6.1. Desire

Belief Theory of Intention

6.2. Bratman on Practical Deliberation and Planning

6.3. Ross and Schroeder on Cognitive Limitations

6.4. Pleasure and Intention

6.5. Joint Intentions

7. Desire and Vividness

7.1. Procrastination

7.2. Searle and Akrasia

7.3. Scanlon, Reason-Judgments, and Akrasia

7.4. Tenenbaum and the Robustness of Desire-Driven Motivation

7.5. Predictable Irrationality and Dennett's Normativism

7.6. Gendler and Alief

8. Willpower

8.1. Redirecting Attention to Control Vividness

8.2. Holton on Effort, Ego-Depletion, and Training

8.3. Sripada and Desire Strength in Willpower

8.4. Levy and Kahneman's Dual-Process Framework

9. Reasons

9.1. Humean Psychology of Reasons

9.2. Van Roojen and Acting on Advice about Reasons

9.3. Kant's House of Lust and Practical Possibilities

9.4. Scanlon and Bracketing Reasons

9.5. Setiya and Reason-Choosing

9.6. Enoch and Deliberative Indispensability

9.7. Morality Isn't about Reasons

10. Agency and the Self

10.1. Humean Self-Constitution

10.2. Wallace, Holton, and Agency in Desire

10.3. Korsgaard and Unified Agency

10.4. Moreau's Paradoxes of Character

10.5. Velleman and Miller on Alienated Agency

10.6. Frankfurt's Unwilling Addict and Pleasure in Goals

10.7. Kant and I

11. Metaethics for Humean Beings

11.1. Human Incapabilism about Moral Judgment

11.2. Cognitivist Internalism Falls into Incapabilism

11.3. Smith's Disjunctive Internalism

11.4. Sophisticated Noncognitivism Falls into Incapabilism

11.5. Externalism about Moral Judgment and Motivation

11.6. Come to Scotland with Me.

Notes:

This edition previously issued in print: 2017.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-108647-9

0-19-182654-5

0-19-108646-0