Normativity and control / David Owens.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Owens, David (David J.), author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Normativity (Ethics).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (247 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.

Summary:

Do we control what we believe? Are we responsible for what we believe? In a series of ten essays David Owens explores various different forms of control we might have over belief, and the different forms of responsibility these forms of control generate.

Contents:

Cover; Normativity and Control; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; Introduction; I.1 Problems of Epistemic Normativity; I.2 Practical Freedom and Reflective Control; I.2.1 Reflection and Self-Control; I.2.2 Reflective Control and the Will; I.2.3 Objections; I.3 Epistemic Akrasia?; I.4 Belief and Reflective Control; I.4.1 Evidentialism; I.4.2 The Impotence of Reflection; I.5 Forms of Accountability and Control; I.6 The Problems of Authority and Control; Part I: Normativity: Epistemic and Practical; 1: Epistemic Akrasia; 1.1 The Judgement Condition: Mooreś Paradox.

1.2 The Judgement Condition: Transparency; 1.3 The Control Condition: Evidential Akrasia; 1.4 The Control Condition: Epistemic Akrasia; 2: Does Belief Have an Aim?; 2.1 Truth as the Aim of Belief; 2.2 Believing and Guessing: Rationality; 2.3 Believing and Guessing: Control; 2.4 Conclusion; 3: Deliberation and the First Person; 3.1 What is Deliberation?; 3.2 Practical and Theoretical Deliberation; 3.3 Reflective Maintenance: Shoemaker; 3.4 Reflective Reasoning: Burge; 3.5 Reflective Deliberation; 3.6 Conclusion; 4: Value and Epistemic Normativity; 4.1 The Bayesian Challenge.

4.2 Alethic Conceptions of Belief; 4.3 Pragmatic Conceptions of Belief; 4.4 Belief and the Passions; 4.5 Epistemic Norms and Normative Interests; Part II: Scepticism; 5: Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume; 5.1 Cartesian Scepticism; 5.1.1 The Role of the Sceptical Hypotheses; 5.1.2 Humeś Misreading of Descartes; 5.2 Humean Scepticism; 5.2.1 Scepticism about Reason and the Senses; 5.2.2 Scepticism about Induction; 5.3 Descartes, Freedom, and Certainty; 5.3.1 Theodicy; 5.3.2 Freedom and Certainty; 5.3.3 Reflection and Certainty; 6: Descartes ́Use of Doubt; 6.1 The Role of Reflection.

6.2 The Need for Certainty; 6.3 Descartes ́Conjectures; 6.4 Descartes ́Suppositions; Part III: Practical Freedom; 7: Freedom and Practical Judgement; 7.1 What is Practical Judgement?; 7.2 Judgement and Ignorance; 7.3 Judgement and Knowledge; 7.4 Practical Freedom; 8: Habitual Agency; 8.1 Acting from Habit; 8.2 The Guise of the Good; 8.3 Habits and Policies; 8.4 Habits and Virtues; Part IV: Testimony; 9: Testimony and Assertion; 9.1 Expressing and Indicating Belief; 9.2 Assertion as Expression; 9.3 Assertion as Assurance; 9.4 Testimony; 9.5 Conclusion; 10: Human Testimony.

10.1 The Rational Entitlement Model of Testimony10.2 The Inheritance Model of Testimony; 10.2.1 Veracity; 10.2.2 Credulity; 10.3 Objections and Clarifications; 10.4 Assertion and Assurance; 10.4.1 Assertion without Assurance; 10.4.2 Testimony without Assurance; Bibliography; Index.

Notes:

This edition previously issued in print: 2017.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on August 22, 2017).

ISBN:

0-19-178166-5