Aquinas's theory of perception : an analytic reconstruction / Anthony J. Lisska.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lisska, Anthony J., author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Perception (Philosophy)--History.

Perception (Philosophy).

Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274.

Thomas.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xviii, 353 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Analytic reconstruction

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

Anthony J. Lisska presents a new analysis of Thomas Aquinas's theory of perception. Approaching the subject from contemporary analytic philosophy, Lisska argues for the importance of inner sense, and suggests a modest 'innate' or 'structured' interpretation for the role of the crucial faculty of vis cogitativa.

Contents:

Cover; Aquinas's Theory of Perception: An Analytic Reconstruction; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Summary; Contents; Introduction: On Reconstructing Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Perception; The Lacuna in Aristotle's De Anima; Phantasm and the Vis Cogitativa; 1: Setting the Problem: History and Context; Perception Theory and Analytic Philosophy; Aquinas and Teleology: A Naturalist Reconstruction; From Ontology to the Philosophy of Mind; Aquinas as Dependent upon yet Distinct from Aristotle; Neo-scholastic Philosophy and Recent Work in Perception Theory

Recent Work in Aristotelian Perception TheoryAppendix 1: On Reading Aquinas Given Several Versions of Aquinas Studies; Appendix 2: Source Material for this Reconstruction of Aquinas on Mind; The Sentencia Libri De Anima; Appendix 3: The Summa Theologiae as a Textbook; Appendix 4: On Dating the Sentencia Libri De Anima; 2: Aquinas on Intentionality; Historical and Contemporary Antecedents; Intentionality in Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind; Intentional' is Not Identical withor Reducible to 'Spiritual'; The Principles of Intentionality in Aquinas's Philosophy of Mind

Principle A. An act can only be an act of some 'X' or other that has a potencyPrinciple B. A potency as such can only be affected by some 'X' or other that is in act; Principle C. A potency of any 'X' must be specified or properly disposed in order to receive any given act; Principle D. An act remains 'specifically' the same but it may have different embodiments or exemplifications in different potencies; Principle D-1. A knower is, by definition, any 'X' which has a set of dispositional properties to acquire or to exemplify acts in a non-entitative or non-materialist manner

The Act/Object DistinctionA Brief Interlude; Principle E. A form is, by definition, an act; Principle F. An 'X' is knowable only insofar as it is in act; Appendix: Aquinas and Contemporary Intentionality Theory; 3: Aquinas and Empiricism: From Aquinas to Brentano and Beyond; Aquinas as an Empiricist; Reid, Gibson, and Aquinas: Epistemological Naturalism Revisited; Direct Realism in Aquinas; Aquinas and Causal Theories of Perception; Haldane and Putnam on Formal Cause: Connections with Aquinas; Intentionality and the Curse of Representationalism; The Return to Form

From Ontology to the Philosophy of MindAquinas on Truth; Appendix: Aquinas, Ordinary Language Philosophy, and Representationalism; 4: Epistemological Dispositions: Causal Powers and the Human Person; The Empedoclean Principle; Aquinas's Modification of 'Like Knows Like'; On Potency and Act; Conceptual Dispositions; A Revised Set of Terms; Dispositions and Substantial Form; The Importance of Dispositions; On Innate Cognitive Structures; Against Physicalism; Beyond Physicalism; The Intensity of a Perfection; Perceptual Dispositions; The Need for the Intellectus Agens

Appendix: Kenny, Ryle, and Geach on Dispositional Properties

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-182337-6

0-19-108366-6