Epistemic friction : an essay on knowledge, truth, and logic / Gila Sher.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Sher, Gila, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Truth.

Logic.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xviii, 370 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Essay on knowledge, truth, and logic

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

Gila Sher offers an original view of knowledge from the perspective of our basic human epistemic situation, as limited yet resourceful beings, trying to understand the world in all its complexity. She develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic, centred on the idea of epistemic friction: knowledge must be constrained by the world.

Contents:

Cover; Epistemic Function: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; Acknowlegments; Part I. Epistemic Friction; 1. Epistemic Friction and Freedom; 1.1 Epistemic Friction and its Roots in Kant, Wittgenstein, and McDowell; 1.2 The Present Conception of Epistemic Friction; FIRST PRINCIPLE; SECOND PRINCIPLE; THIRD PRINCIPLE; FOURTH PRINCIPLE; FIFTH PRINCIPLE; SIXTH PRINCIPLE; SEVENTH PRINCIPLE; 1.3 Epistemic Freedom; 1.4 Between Friction and Freedom; 2. A Sustainable Epistemic Methodology; 2.1 Epistemic Friction and the Illusion of Foundationalism

2.2 From Foundationalism to Foundational HolismI. Foundation without foundationalism; II. Foundational holism; PART II. A Dynamic Model of Knowledge; 3. Quine's Model of Knowledge: An Inner Tension; 3.1 The Initial Promise of Quine's Model; 3.2 An Inner Problem in Quine's Model; 3.3 Objections and Responses; 3.4 Dummett's Solution to the Inner Problem; 3.5 A New Solution; 4. Dynamic Model-Two Dimensions of Change; 4.1 Contextual Dynamic; I. Change of perspective; II. Multiplicity of factors; 4.2 Temporal-Developmental Dynamic; I. Change from conceptual to factual orientation (and vice versa)

II. Movement from "rear" to "front" of knowledge (and vice versa)III. "Fixing" and "unfixing" constituents of knowledge; 5. Reality, Intellect, Realism; 5.1 The Basic Epistemic Situation; 5.2 Reality: Beyond Platonism and Nominalism; 5.3 Intellect: Beyond Apriorism and Empiricism; 5.4 Robust yet Non-Rigid Realism; 6. Differences with Quine; 6.1 Contrasts with Quine's Model; I. Quine's radical empiricism as underwriting his neglect of reason (intellect); II. Quine's conflicted approach to abstract knowledge: logic, mathematics, and theoretical science

6.2 Immunity to Criticisms of Quine's ModelPART III. The Structure of Truth; 7. A Substantivist Theory of Truth; 7.1 A Substantivist (as Opposed to Deflationist) Methodology; 7.2 The Unity and Disunity of Truth: Challenges and Strategies; I. Disunity challenges; A RADICAL DISUNITY CHALLENGE; A MODERATE DISUNITY CHALLENGE; II. Pluralism in perspective; III. Unity challenges; UNITY IN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY; SUBSTANTIVE UNIFYING PRINCIPLES; 8. Basic Principles of Truth; 8.1 The Fundamental Principle of Truth; 8.2 Ramifications for Skepticism; I. Local truth-skepticism: ethics

II. Global truth-skepticismIII. Relativism; IV. The diallelon; 8.3 The "Manifold" Correspondence Principle; 8.4 Application to Mathematics (A New Theory of Mathematical Truth); I. Mathematics and the world; II. The subject matter of mathematics; III. A "composite" route of mathematical correspondence; IV. Merits of the present account; V. Relation to other philosophical views; VI. The problem of mixed sentences and inferences; 8.5 The Logicality Principle (Tarski's Theory of Truth in Perspective); I. Tarski's theory as a theory of the contribution of logical structure to truth

TARSKI'S METHOD OF DEFINING TRUTH

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-182203-5

0-19-108129-9