Fixing reference / Imogen Dickie.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Dickie, Imogen, 1972- author.

Series:

Context and content.

Context and Content

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Reference (Philosophy).

Philosophy of mind.

Language and languages--Philosophy.

Language and languages.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (x, 333 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2015.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness - fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference - fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.

Contents:

Cover; Fixing Reference; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgements; 1: Introduction; 1.1 The Question and Basic Componentsof the Answer; 1.2 Preliminaries; 1.2.1 Language and thought; 1.2.2 Naturalism vs non-naturalism; 1.2.3 Justification; 1.2.4 The status of examples; 1.2.5 Explanatory ambitions; 1.2.6 The notion of an ordinary object and the 'problem of the many'; Note; 2: In Which a Precise Version of the Connection Between Aboutness and Justification Is Derived From More Basic Principles; Introduction; 2.1 TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION

2.2 From TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION to REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION2.3 The Objection from Potential Counter examples; APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 2; Appendix A: Proof of the Uniqueness Lemma; Appendix B: Not About Nothing; 3: The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself; Introduction; 3.1 Anscombe's Distinction Between Practical and Speculative Knowledge; 3.2 From Anscombian Practical Knowledge to Justification by Intention; 3.3 The Need to Represent; 3.4 The Need to Represent and the NormativeStatus of Direct Coordination; 3.5 Reference, Justification, and Orders of

4: Perceptual DemonstrativesIntroduction; 4.1 An Empirical Component; 4.2 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (I)-Structure; 4.3 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (II)-Normativity; Interim Conclusion; 4.4 Three Puzzles about Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing; 4.4.1 First puzzle: Classification; 4.4.2 Second puzzle: Comprehension; 4.4.3 Third puzzle: Directness; 4.5 The Problem of Empty Perceptual Demonstrative Thought; 4.6 Perceptual Demonstrative Thought and the Nature of Perception; 5: Proper Names; Introduction; 5.1 Descriptivisms vs Causalisms: The Traditional Debate

5.2 Evans on Proper NamesInterim Conclusion; 5.3 Proper Names in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework; 5.4 Varieties of Deference; APPENDICES TO CHAPTER 5; Appendix A: Additional Intricacies; Appendix B: The Context-Dependence of Proper-Name-Based Aboutness; 6: The Delicate Question of Reference by Description; Introduction; 6.1 Russell; 6.2 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (I)-Truth Conditions; 6.3 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (II)-Justification; Conclusion; 7: Descriptions and Singular Thought; Introduction

7.1 The Boundaries of Description-Based Singular Thought7.2 Object Dependence; 7.3 Comparison with Extant Proposals: Extended Acquaintance and Modified Semantic Instrumentalism; 7.3.1 Extended acquaintance; 7.3.2 Modified semantic instrumentalism; 8: Thought and Consciousness; Introduction; 8.1 Naturalism in the REFERENCE AND JUSTIFICATION Framework; 8.2 Putting Consciousness Back In; 8.3 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (I)-The Role of Motivational Phenomenology; Interim Conclusion; 8.4 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (II)-Thought Without Perceptual Awareness?

8.4.1 The question of role

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed January 19, 2016).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-107221-4

0-19-181675-2

0-19-107220-6

OCLC:

936624370