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Unbelievable errors : an error theory about all normative judgements / Bart Streumer.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Streumer, Bart, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Normativity (Ethics).
Judgment (Ethics).
Errors.
Ethics, Modern.
Metaethics.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xvii, 223 pages) : illustrations (black and white)
Edition:
First edition.
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Summary:
'Unbelievable Errors' defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory.
Contents:
Epigraph
Preface
Acknowledgements
Copyright
I Normative Judgements and Properties
II The Reduction Argument
III Further Versions of the Reduction Argument
IV The False Guarantee and Regress Objections
V Further Defences of Realism
VI The Symmetry Objection
VII Further Views
VIII The Error Theory
IX Believing the Error Theory
X Reason to Believe the Error Theory
XI Objections, Rejection, Revision
XII Effects, Parallels, Progress
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
Notes:
This edition previously issued in print: 2017.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on August 22, 2017).
Other Format:
Print version :
ISBN:
0-19-108895-1
0-19-184807-7

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