Consciousness in Locke / Shelley Weinberg.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Weinberg, Shelley, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Locke, John, 1632-1704--Criticism and interpretation.

Locke, John.

Consciousness.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xv, 240 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness helps solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology, and his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. The model of consciousness set forth here binds these key issues with a common thread.

Contents:

Cover ; Consciousness in Locke; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1: Consciousness in the Seventeenth Century; 1.1 'Consciousness' and 'Conscience'; 1.2 Descartes; 1.3 Malebranche and Arnauld; 1.4 Cudworth; 1.5 Locke's Development (Parallels to Locke); 2: Consciousness in Locke's Philosophical Psychology; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Consciousness is Identical to Perception in General; 2.2.1 Consciousness is identical to reflection; 2.2.2 Consciousness is a source of ideas; 2.3 Consciousness is a Self-Referential Constituent of Ordinary Perception

2.3.1 An objection and replies2.4 The Relation Consciousness Bears to Perception; 2.5 Consciousness in Memory, Sensitive Knowledge, Personal Identity, and the Cogito; 2.6 Conclusion; 3: Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Knowledge; PART I: Knowing our own Ideas (and Ourselves); 3.I.1 Lockean Representation; 3.I.2 Perceptions of Ideas Convey Knowledge; 3.I.3 Knowledge of an Idea as Propositional; 3.I.4 The Agreement in Knowing an Idea; 3.I.5. An Analogous Case: Knowing I Exist; 3.I.6 Problems of Perceptual Error; 3.I.7 A Textual Objection and Reply; 3.I.8 Conclusion

PART II: Knowing the Existence of Particular External Objects3.II.1 Locke's Commitments-The Elements of Sensitive Knowledge; 3.II.2 Sensitive Knowledge is the Perception of an Agreement of Ideas; 3.II.3 From an Idea of an Object to the Real Existence of the Object; 3.II.3.1 Why simple ideas of sensation conform to their causes; 3.II.4 From Real Existence to Actual Real Existence; 3.II.5 Locke's Reply to Stillingfleet; 3.II.6 Conclusion; PART III: Sensitive Knowledge and the Skeptical Challenge; 3.III.1 Locke's Epistemic Task

3.III.2 The Similarity of Intuitive and Sensitive Knowledge: The Nature of Intuitive Knowledge3.III.3 The Similarity of Intuitive and Sensitive Knowledge: The Case for Sensitive Knowledge; 3.III.4 The Difference in Degree of Certainty of Sensitive and Intuitive Knowledge; 3.III.5 Conclusion; 4: Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity; 4.1 The Metaphysical Fact of a Continuing Consciousness; 4.2 Consciousness and Memory-Two Questions; 4.3 Knowledge of the Metaphysical Fact of the Diachronic Self; 4.4 Conclusion; 5: Consciousness and Moral Motivation

5.1 Motivation, Self-Preservation, and Happiness5.2 Motivation to Pursue Greater Goods; 5.3 Suspension of Desire and the Pursuit of a Greater Good; 5.4 Consciousness and the Concern for Happiness; 5.5 The Unity of Consciousness and MoralMotivation; 5.6 Animals are Conscious Too; 5.7 Conclusion; Conclusion; References; Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed February 06, 2016).

ISBN:

0-19-106585-4

0-19-181165-3

0-19-106584-6