The meaning of 'ought' : beyond descriptivism and expressivism in metaethics / Matthew Chrisman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chrisman, Matthew, author.

Series:

Oxford moral theory.

Oxford Moral Theory

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Expressivism (Ethics).

Ethics.

Semantics (Philosophy).

Emotivism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xvi, 260 pages).

Other Title:

Beyond descriptivism and expressivism in metaethics

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The word 'ought' is one of the core normative terms, but it is also a modal word. This book develops a careful account of the semantics of 'ought' as a modal operator and uses this to motivate a novel inferentialist account of why ought-sentences have the meaning that they have. The inferentialist theory defended in this book agrees with descriptivist theories in metaethics that specifying the truth conditions of normative sentences is a central part of the explanation of their meaning.

Contents:

1.Introduction

1.1.The Ubiquity of Ought'

1.2.Some Initial Theoretical Cartography

1.3.Metanormative Theorizing and the Philosophy of Language

1.4.Compositional Semantics: Some Basics

1.5.The Word `Ought'

1.6.Plan

2.`Ought's, Obligations, Reasons, and Values

2.1.Introduction

2.2.Formal Framework and Toy Analysis of `Ought'

2.3.An Initial Ambiguity View

2.4.Analyzing `Ought' in Terms of Reasons

2.5.Analyzing `Ought' in Terms of Values

2.6.Conclusion

3.A Possible Worlds Semantics for `Ought'

3.1.Introduction

3.2.From Modal Logic to Deontic Necessity and Possibility

3.3.From Deontic Necessity to a Simple Possible Worlds Semantics for `Ought'

3.4.Some Reasons to Complicate the Analysis

3.5.Kratzer's Improvements

3.6.Application of Kratzer's Framework to `Ought'

3.7.The Weakness of `Ought' Compared to `Must'

3.8.Conclusion

4.Problems with Possible Worlds

4.1.Introduction

4.2.The Challenge of Dilemmas

4.3.The Challenge of `Ought-to-Do'

4.4.Conclusion

5.A New Semantic Rule for `Ought'

5.1.Introduction

5.2.Is `Ought' Polysemous between Agentive and Nonagentive Readings?

5.3.Imperatival Content

5.4.A New Semantic Rule for `Ought'

5.5.Conclusion

6.Metanormative Debate Renewed

6.1.Introduction

6.2.Truth Conditions as Ways Reality Could Be

6.3.Truth Conditions as What One Ought to Think

6.4.Truth Conditions as Positions in a Space of Implications

6.5.Conclusion

7.Conclusion

7.1.Introduction

7.2.Should the Metalanguage of Metanormative Theory Be Nonnormative?

7.3.What about Other Normative and Evaluative Words and Concepts?

7.4.Moral Psychology

7.5.The Epistemology of Normativity

7.6.Conclusion.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-046362-7

0-19-936302-1

0-19-936301-3