Experiencing time / Simon Prosser.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Prosser, Simon, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Time--Philosophy.

Time.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 221 pages) : illustrations

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

Our engagement with time is a ubiquitous feature of our lives, but how does our encounter with it reveal the true nature of temporal reality? Simon Prosser addresses central questions at the heart of this debate, and explores our understanding of time, its passage, and our experience of changes, rates, and durations.

Contents:

Cover; Experiencing Time; Copyright; Contents; Acknowledgements; Preface; List of Figures; List of Tables; 1: Introduction: The Metaphysics of Time; 1.1. The A-theory and the B-theory; 1.2. Ontological Variants of the A-theory; 1.3. Other Variants of the A-theory; 1.4. The B-theory; 1.5. The Direction of Time; 1.6. Arguments for the B-theory; 1.6.1. McTaggart's paradox; 1.6.2. Arguments from relativity theory; 1.6.3. The rate at which time passes; 2: Experience and the Passage of Time; 2.1. Experiencing Ontic Becoming; 2.2. L. A. Paul's Argument; 2.3. The Privileged Present

2.4. The Detector Argument2.5. Huw Price's Argument and Tim Maudlin's Reply; 2.6. The Multi-Detector Argument; 2.7. Some Objections to the Multi-Detector Argument; 2.8. Can Experience Represent the Passage of Time?; 2.9. The Unintelligibility of the A-theory; 2.9.1. Can language or thought represent A-theoretic features?; 2.9.2. The A-theory is unintelligible; 2.9.3. Is the B-theory intelligible?; 3: Attitudes to the Past, Present, and Future; 3.1. The Date Theory and the Token-Reflexive Theory; 3.2. Thank Goodness That's Over; 3.3. The Person-Reflexive Theory; 3.4. Why Thank Goodness?

3.5. SEF Relations3.6. Unarticulated Constituents and First-Person Redundancy; 3.7. 'Now', and the Problem of Cognitive Dynamics; 4: Experiencing Rates and Durations; 4.1. Life at a Different Pace; 4.2. Intentionalism; 4.3. The Content of 'Rate' and 'Duration' Experience; 4.4. Functionalist Intentionalism; 4.5. More About Temporal SEF Relations; 4.6. The Multiple Contents of Experience; 4.7. Problems for Rival Versions of Intentionalism; 4.8. The Rate at which Time Seems to Pass; 5: Is Experience Temporally Extended?; 5.1. Perceiving Change; 5.2. The Specious Present

5.3. An Argument for the Specious Present?5.4. The Dynamic Snapshot Theory; 5.5. Motion and the Cartesian Theatre; 5.6. Experiencing Discontinuous Changes; 5.7. Further Arguments for the Specious Present; 5.8. The Retentional Model; 5.9. The Extensional Model; 5.10. Beyond the Cartesian Theatre; 5.11. Taking Stock; 6: Why Does Change Seem Dynamic?; 6.1. Existing Accounts of the Illusion of Passage; 6.2. A Methodological Proposal; 6.3. Are Dynamic Features Represented in Experience?; 6.4. Dynamic Experience has a Necessarily False Content; 6.5. Change and Endurance

6.6. Responses to Objections6.7. Why is Endurance Represented?; 6.8. Concluding Remarks; 7: Moving Through Time, and the Open Future; 7.1. The Sense of Temporal Motion; 7.2. The Open Future; 7.3. The Black-Box Self; 7.4. Freedom and the Open Future; 7.5. Subjects and SEF Relations; 7.6. Why Does Time Seem to Pass?; Bibliography; Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-181157-2

0-19-106577-3