Essays in moral skepticism / Richard Joyce.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Joyce, Richard, 1966- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Skepticism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (274 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

This volume draws together Richard Joyce's work from the last decade on moral skepticism, the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. Joyce's radical view is that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true.

Contents:

Cover; Essays in Moral Skepticism; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction: Morality: The Evolution of a Myth; Error Theory; Evolution and Debunking; Projectivism and Fictionalism; Part I: Error Theory; 1: Expressivism, Motivation Internalism, and Hume; Expressivism and Motivation Internalism; Variants of Expressivism and Motivation Internalism; Expressing Mental States; Amoralist Cancellation; Frege-Expression; Hume: Expressivist, Cognitivist, and Skeptic?; 2: Morality, Schmorality; 3: The Accidental Error; Introduction; Response Dependent Morality

Prinz's Relativistic Sensibility TheoryFirth's Ideal Observer Theory; Scanlon's Hypothetical Contractualism; Virtue Ethics; Conclusion; 4: Metaethical Pluralism: How both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism may be Permissible Positions; Introduction: Some Definitions; Lewis's Pluralism; Carnap's Pragmatism; Cognitivism versus Noncognitivism; The Benefits of being Horribly Wrong; Quine's Sectarianism and Ecumenicalism; PART II: Evolution and Debunking; 5: The Origins of Moral Judgment; Introduction; Adaptations versus Spandrels; What is the Trait under Investigation?

Implications of CognitivismConclusion; 6: The Many Moral Nativisms; The First Node of Imprecision: Innateness; From Altruism to Darwin; The Second Node of Imprecision: Content versus Concept; Some Anti-Nativist Hypotheses; The Third Node of Imprecision: Moral Judgment; Conclusion; 7: Evolution, Truth-Tracking, and Moral Skepticism; Introduction; Types of Debunking; Justification and Truth-Tracking; Adaptation and Truth-Tracking; Morality and Truth-Tracking; Conclusion: Shifting the Burden of Proof; 8: Irrealism and the Genealogy of Morals; Introduction to Moral Debunking Arguments

Epistemological DebunkingError-Theoretic Debunking; Noncognitivist Debunking; Conclusion; PART III: Projectivism and Fictionalism; 9: Patterns of Objectification; 10: Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?; The Many Moral Projectivisms; Turning a Philosophical Metaphor into an Empirical Hypothesis; The Phenomenological Thesis; Objectivity; Experience; Morality; The Causal Thesis; Moral Projectivism: The General and the Particular; Conclusion; 11: Moral Fictionalism; If there is Nothing that We Morally Ought to Do, then What Ought We to Do?; Critical Contexts; Fictive Judgments

Noncognitivism and the Lone FictionalistThe Value of Morality; Moral Fictionalism; Moral Fictionalism as a Precommitment; Conclusion; 12: Psychological Fictionalism, and the Threat of Fictionalist Suicide; Introduction; Hermeneutic versus Revolutionary Fictionalism; Cognitivist versus Noncognitivist Fictionalism; Unsuspecting Fictionalizing; The Benefits of Fictionalism; Relativistic Fictionalism; Fictionalist Suicide; References; Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-107710-0

0-19-181986-7

0-19-107709-7

OCLC:

937719143