A minimal libertarianism : free will and the promise of reduction / Christopher Evan Franklin.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Franklin, Christopher Evan, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Free will and determinism.

Libertarianism.

Reductionism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xii, 233 pages)

Other Title:

Free will and the promise of reduction

Place of Publication:

New York, New York : Oxford University Press, [2018]

Summary:

In this work, Franklin develops and defends a version of event-causal libertarianism about free will and moral responsibility. This view is a combination of libertarianism - the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the upshots of nondeterministic causal processes - and agency reductionism - the view that the causal role of agents in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agents.

Contents:

PART I: Toward a Minimal Libertarianism

CHAPTER 1. Minimal Event-Causal Libertarianism

1.1 Causal Theory of Action

1.2 Agency Reductionism

1.3 Libertarianism

1.4 Varieties of Libertarianism

1.5 Event-Causal Libertarianism

1.6 Minimal Event-Causal Libertarianism

1.7 Conclusion

CHAPTER 2. A Theory of Moral Accountability

2.1 Building the Framework

2.2 Reactive Attitudes and Moral Accountability

2.3 Three Kinds of Pleas

2.4 A Theory of Morally Accountable Agency

2.5 Addiction and Extreme Stress

2.6 Conclusion

CHAPTER 3. Abilities, Opportunities, and Determinism

3.1 Parting Ways

3.2 Free Will, Abilities, and Opportunities

3.3 Abilities

3.4 Opportunities

3.5 The No Opportunity Argument

3.6 The New Dispositionalism

3.7 Vihvelin on Narrow and Wide Abilities

3.8 Conclusion

CHAPTER 4. The Role and Location of Indeterminism

4.1 Two Questions

4.2 Non-Action-Centered Libertarianism

4.3 Kane's Nonbasic Action-Centered Libertarianism

4.4 Four Problems with Kane's Account

4.5 Basic Action-Centered Libertarianism

4.6 Conclusion.

PART II: The Promise of Reduction

CHAPTER 5. The Problem of Luck

5.1 Interlude

5.2 The Luck Argument

5.3 No Causation Formulation

5.4 Ensurance Formulation

5.5 Rollback Formulation

5.6 Explanatory Formulation

5.7 Conclusion

CHAPTER 6. The Problem of Enhanced Control

6.1 Enhancing Control

6.2 Generalizing the Problem

6.3 Opportunities Enhance Control

6.4 Conclusion

CHAPTER 7. The Limits of Event-Causal Libertarianism

7.1 Taking Stock

7.2 The Disappearing Agent Objection

7.3 A Dilemma for the Disappearing Agent Objection

7.4 The It Ain't Me Argument

7.5 Exclusion Arguments

7.6 Agency Reductionist Options

7.7 Conclusion.

Notes:

Previously issued in print: 2018.

OUP approval plan 2018

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on January 11, 2018).

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-068280-9

0-19-068281-7