Probabilistic knowledge / Sarah Moss.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Moss, Sarah (Philosopher), author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Probabilities--Philosophy.

Probabilities.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Epistemic logic.

Semantics (Philosophy).

Assertion (Linguistics).

Conditionals (Logic).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xi, 268 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

Sarah Moss argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. She introduces the notion of probabilistic content and shows how it plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language. Just you can believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents.

Contents:

The case for probabilistic contents

The case for probabilistic assertion

Epistemic modals and probability operators

Indicative conditionals

The case for probabilistic knowledge

Factivity

Skepticism

Knowledge and belief

Knowledge and action

Knowledge and persons

A formal semantics for epistemic vocabulary.

Notes:

This edition previously issued in print: 2018.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-251059-2

0-19-186126-X

0-19-251058-4