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Belief about the self : a defense of the property theory of content / Neil Feit.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Feit, Neil, author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Self (Philosophy).
- Belief and doubt.
- Propositional attitudes.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (xvi, 195 pages)
- Other Title:
- Defense of the property theory of content
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- Philosophers typically suppose that the contents of our beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are propositions - things that might be true or false, and their truth values do not vary from time to time, place to place, or person to person. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down in the face of beliefs about the self.
- Contents:
- Mental content and the problem of De Se belief
- Cognitive attitudes and content
- The doctrine of propositions
- The problem of De Se belief
- The property theory of content
- In favor of the property theory
- Perry's messy shopper and the argument from explanation
- Lewis's case of the two Gods
- Arguments from internalism and physicalism
- An inference to the best explanation
- Alternatives to the property theory
- The triadic view of belief
- How the property theory and the triadic view are rivals
- Dyadic propositionalism reconsidered
- Arguments against the property theory
- Self-ascription and self-awareness
- Nonexistence and impossible contents
- Stalnaker's argument
- Propositionalist arguments from inference
- The property theory and De Re belief
- Lewis's account of De Re belief
- McKay's objection to Lewis
- Mistaken identity and the case of the shy secret admirer
- Some other worries and concluding remarks
- The property theory, rationality, and Kripke's puzzle about belief
- Kripke's puzzle about belief
- The puzzle argument
- A solution to the puzzle
- Puzzles with empty names and kind terms
- The property theory, twin earth, and belief about kinds
- Twin earth and two kinds of internalism
- The twin earth argument
- An internalist response (stage one)
- An internalist response (stage two)
- Self-ascription and belief about kinds.
- Notes:
- Description based upon print version of record.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 187-191) and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- ISBN:
- 0-19-045092-4
- 1-281-85213-9
- 9786611852139
- 0-19-971226-3
- OCLC:
- 316260365
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