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The normative web : an argument for moral realism / Terence Cuneo.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Cuneo, Terence, 1969- author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Moral realism.
Ethics.
Realism.
Epistemics.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (263 pages)
Other Title:
Argument for moral realism
Place of Publication:
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Antirealist views about morality claim that moral facts or truths do not exist. Do these views imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic ones, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. Terence Cuneo argues that the similarities between moral and epistemic facts provide excellent reason to believe that, if moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist. But epistemic facts, it is argued, do exist: to deny theirexistence would commit us to an extreme version of epistemological skepticism. Therefore, Cuneo concludes, moral facts e
Contents:
Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort
Defending the parallel
The parity premise
Epistemic nihilism
Epistemic expressivism : traditional views
Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views
Epistemic reductionism
Three objections to the core argument.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [248]-260) and index.
Description based on print version record.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
ISBN:
0-19-161481-5
0-19-171174-8
0-19-152737-8
1-281-14978-0
9786611149789
1-4356-2176-X
OCLC:
319063812

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