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The ontology of mind : events, processes, and states / Helen Steward.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Steward, Helen, author.
- Series:
- Oxford philosophical monographs.
- Oxford philosophical monographs
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Philosophy of mind.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (viii, 276 pages).
- Other Title:
- Events, processes, and states
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford : Clarendon, 1997.
- Summary:
- Steward puts forward a radical critique of the foundations of contemporary philosophy of mind, arguing that it relies too heavily on insecure assumptions about the nature of some of the sorts of mental entities it postulates.
- Contents:
- Events and Processes
- Events, Particularity, and Properties
- Kim: Exemplifications of Properties at Times
- Property Exemplifications and Theories of Mind
- Particularity and the Secret Life Requirement
- Bennett: Events as Tropes
- Bennett's Argument against Anomalous Monism
- Events as Changes
- Happenings
- Events as Changes in Objects
- Is there a Motivation for the RCO?
- Composite Events and the Composition Relation
- Are there Changeless Events?
- States and Change
- The Temporal Strategy: Time and Aspect
- Vendler and Kenny
- Types of Verb versus Types of Predication
- Aspect
- Nominalization Transcriptions: Events and Processes
- Non-paradigmatic Events
- Event and Process as Ontological Categories
- Temporal Shape
- States, Causation, and Causal Explanation
- States and the Type-Token Distinction
- States and Properties
- Nominalization Transcriptions: States
- The 'State of ... ' Locution
- The Type-Token Distinction
- Token States in Philosophy of Mind
- Particulars, Facts, and Causal Explanations
- Forms of Causal Explanation
- Singular Causal Claims
- Sentential Causal Explanations
- The Existential Generalization Account
- Causation and Causal Explanation
- Efficacy, Causing, and Relevance
- Child on Causation and Causal Explanation
- Program and Process Explanations
- Sentential Explanations as Program Explanations
- Why there are no Causally Efficacious Properties
- States and Causality in Philosophy of Mind
- The Network Model of Causation in Philosophy of Mind.
- Notes:
- Based on author's doctoral thesis.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- Other Format:
- Print version
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