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Perspectival thought : a plea for (moderate) relativism / Francois Recanati.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Récanati, François, 1952- author.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Relativity.
- Relationism.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (ix, 308 pages)
- Other Title:
- Plea for (moderate) relativism
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is so, Fran--ccedil--;ois Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual factors in addition towhat is explicitly represented. Far from reducing to the context-independent meaning of the sentence-type or, in the psyc
- Contents:
- Moderate relativism
- The framework
- The distribution of content
- Radical vs. moderate relativism
- Two levels of content
- Branch points for moderate relativism
- The debate over temporalism (1) : do we need temporal propositions?
- Modal vs. extensional treatments of tense
- What is at stake?
- Modal and temporal innocence
- Temporal operators and temporal propositions in an extensional framework
- The debate over temporalism (2) : can we believe temporal propositions?
- An epistemic argument against temporalism
- Rebutting Richard's argument
- Relativistic disagreement
- Relativization and indexicality
- Index, context, and content
- The two-stage picture : Lewis vs. Kaplan and Stalnaker
- Rescuing the two-stage picture
- Content, character, and cognitive significance
- Experience and subjectivity
- Content and mode
- Duality and the fallacy of misplaced information
- The content of perceptual judgements
- Episodic memory
- Immunity to error through misidentification
- Implicit self-reference
- Weak and strong immunity
- Quasi-perception and quasi-memory
- Reflexive states
- Relativization and reflexivity
- The (alleged) reflexivity of de se thoughts
- Reflexivity : internal or external?
- What is wrong with reflexivism
- The first person point of view
- De se thoughts and subjectivity
- Memory and the imagination
- Imagination and the self
- Imagination, empathy, and the quasi-de se
- Egocentricity and beyond
- Unarticulated constituents in the lekton?
- The context-dependence of the lekton : how far can we go?
- Unarticulatedness and the 'concerning' relation
- Three (alleged) arguments for the externality principle
- Invariance
- Self-relative thoughts
- The problem of the essential indexical
- Perry against relativized propositions
- Context-relativity
- Implicit and explicit de se thoughts
- Shiftability
- The generalized reflexive constraint
- Parametric invariance and m-shiftability
- Free shiftability
- The anaphoric mode : a Buhlerian perspective.
- Notes:
- Description based upon print version of record.
- Includes bibliographical references (p. [291]-299) and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- ISBN:
- 0-19-923054-4
- 1-281-15030-4
- 9786611150303
- 0-19-152814-5
- 1-4356-2206-5
- OCLC:
- 517457195
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