Truly understood / Christopher Peacocke.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Peacocke, Christopher.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Comprehension (Theory of knowledge).

Truth.

Reference (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (356 p.)

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

In Truly Understood, Christopher Peacocke argues that truth and reference have a much deeper role in the explanation of meaning and understanding than has hitherto been appreciated. Examination of specific concepts shows that a grasp of these concepts has to be characterized in terms of reference, identity, and relations to the world. Peacocke develops a positive general theory of understanding based on the idea that concepts are individuated by their fundamentalreference rules, which contrasts sharply with conceptual-role, inferentialist, and pragmatist approaches to meaning. He treats though

Contents:

A theory of understanding

Truth's role in understanding

Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts

Do pragmatist views avoid this critique?

A realistic account

How evidence and truth are related

Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding

Anchoring

Next steps

Reference and reasons

The main thesis and its location

Exposition and four argument-types

Significance and consequences of the main thesis

The first person as a case study

Fully self-conscious thought

Immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first person

Can a use of the first-person concept fail to refer?

Some conceptual roles are distinctive but not fundamental

Implicit conceptions

Implicit conceptions : motivation and examples

Deflationary readings rejected

The phenomenon of new principles

Explanation by implicit conceptions

Rationalist aspects

Consequences : rationality, justification, understanding

Transitional

Applications to mental concepts

Conceiving of conscious states

Understanding and identity in other cases

Constraints on legitimate explanations in terms of identity

Why is the subjective case different?

Attractions of the interlocking account

Tacit knowledge, and externalism about the internal

Is this the myth of the given?

Knowledge of others' conscious states

Communicability : between Frege and Wittgenstein

Conclusions and significance

'Another I' : representing perception and action

The core rule

Modal status and its significance

Comparisons

The possession-condition and some empirical phenomena

The model generalized

Wider issues

Mental action

The distinctive features of action-awareness

The nature and range of mental actions

The principal hypothesis and its grounds

The principal hypothesis : distinctions and consequences

How do we know about our own mental actions?

Concepts of mental actions and their epistemological significance

Is this account open to the same objections as perceptual models of introspection?

Characterizing and unifying schizophrenic experience

The first person in the self-ascription of action

Rational agency and action-awareness

Representing thoughts

The puzzle

A proposal

How the solution treats the constraints that generate the puzzle

Relation to single-level treatments

An application : reconciling externalism with distinctive self-knowledge.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references (p. [321]-330) and index.

Description based on print version record.

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-161484-X

0-19-958197-5

1-281-85286-4

9786611852863

0-19-152885-4

OCLC:

231831610