Quine versus Davidson : truth, reference, and meaning / Gary Kemp.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kemp, Gary, 1959- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Quine, W. V. (Willard Van Orman).

Quine, W. V.

Davidson, Donald, 1917-2003.

Davidson, Donald.

Semantics (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (viii, 191 pages)

Other Title:

Truth, reference, and meaning

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2012.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Gary Kemp presents a penetrating investigation of key issues in the philosophy of language, by means of a comparative study of two great figures of late twentieth-century philosophy. So far as language and meaning are concerned, Willard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson are usually regarded as birds of a feather. The two disagreed in print on various matters over the years, but fundamentally they seem to be in agreement; most strikingly, Davidson's thought experiment of Radical Interpretation looks to be a more sophisticated, technically polished version of Quinean Radical Translation. Yet Q

Contents:

Cover; Contents; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Introduction; I. Quine, Davidson, and the status of meaning; II. An outline of the main disputes; III. The positive side of naturalism and its consequences; 1. Facets of Naturalism; I. The roots of naturalism: Quine's response to Carnap; II. Naturalized epistemology; III. Aspects of the naturalized study of human language; IV. Indeterminacy and inscrutability; V. Naturalized ontology and ontological relativity; VI. Miscellaneous points; A. Compositionality and Chomsky; B. Naturalism and truth

C. Consequences of naturalism: semantical holism, instrumentalism, realism, and objectivity; D. Anomalous monism and the propositional attitudes; 2. Davidson's Semantics; I. Davidson's idea; II. Conditions on T-sentences; III. A simple illustration; IV. Radical interpretation and holism; V. The interdependence of meaning and belief, and the principle of charity; VI. Lepore and Ludwig; 3. Truth, Deflationism, and the T-schema; I. Deflationism; II. Truth-schema deflationism, other languages, and indexicality; III. The deductive and expressive inadequacy of the T-schema

IV. Substantiality and deflationism; V. Tarski-based deflationism; VI. Quine versus Davidson over truth; VII. Inconsistency; Appendix; 4. Quine versus Davidson on Reference; I. Davidson's response to the inscrutability of reference; II. The proximate and the distal; III. The scientiflc superiority of the proximate over the distal; IV. Semanticalism; V. Anomalous monism again; VI. GE-sentence variation; 5. Living with Naturalism; I. Is it self-refuting?; II. Quine, Davidson, science, and the swampman; III. Analyticity; IV. Normativity; V. Life with naturalism: vagueness, intuition, and language.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed on Mar. 5, 2012).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

1-280-59441-1

9786613624246

0-19-162921-9

OCLC:

784886688