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The nature of perception / John Foster.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Foster, John, 1941 May 5- author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Perception (Philosophy).
Philosophy.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (viii, 289 pages) : illustrations
Place of Publication:
Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2000]
Language Note:
English
Summary:
John Foster considers whether perceptual contact with a physical object is something fundamental, or if it breaks down into further factors. If the latter, what are these factors, and how do they combine to secure the contact?
Contents:
Part 1. The reshaping of the issue. The traditional issue ; The two interpretations ; SDR and BRT
pt. 2. An examination of strong direct realism. The issue before us ; The causal argument ; Contact and content ; The presentational view ; The internalist view ; Conclusion
pt. 3. The mediating psychological state. Introduction ; The cognitive theory ; The imagist proposal ; The nature of the secondary qualities ; The sense-datum theory ; The adverbilist alternative ; The sense-datum theory revised
pt. 4. The problem of perception. Introduction ; The emergence of the problem ; An argument from analogy ; A deepening of the problem ; Taking stock
pt. 5. The idealist solution. The new option ; An argument for idealism ; The unfinished story.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [285]-286) and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
0-19-925662-4
1-281-94364-9
9786611943646
0-19-151926-X
OCLC:
57475291

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