The lewd, the rude and the nasty : a study of thick concepts in ethics / Pekka Vayrynen.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Väyrynen, Pekka, author.

Series:

Oxford moral theory.

Oxford moral theory

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xi, 270 pages)

Other Title:

Study of thick concepts in ethics

Place of Publication:

New York : Oxford University Press, 2013.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

In addition to 'thin' concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to 'thick' concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind - concepts that somehow combine evaluation and nonevaluative description. Thick terms and concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in meaning or content. And many philosophers have claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance for many general issues in moral philosophy, including the distinction between 'facts' and 'values', objectivity in ethics, the possibility of moral theory in traditional style and more. This book argues that all of this is mistaken.

Contents:

1. Why Thick Concepts Matter

1.1 A Brief Preview

1.2 The Intuitive Distinction

1.3 Two Questions About the Thick

1.4 Thick Matters

1.5 Looking Ahead

2. Thick Concepts,Meaning and Evaluation

2.1 What Is Evaluation?

2.2 What Is Meaning?

2.3 What Count as Thick Terms and Concepts

2.4 Global versus Embedded Evaluations

3. Against the Semantic View I: The Data

3.1 Methodology: A Quick Overview

3.2 Objectionable Thick Terms and Concepts

3.3 Evaluations and Projection

3.4 Evaluations and Deniability

3.5 Conclusion

4. Against the Semantic View II: Against Rival Explanations

4.1 Three False Starts

4.2 Unwanted Implicatures?

4.3 Empty Thick Concepts?

4.4 "Inverted Commas" Uses of Thick Terms?

4.5 Deniability and Metalinguistic Negation

4.6 Conclusion

5. In Defense of the Pragmatic View

5.1 T-Evaluations and Implicature

5.2 T-Evaluations and Conventions of Use

5.3 T-Evaluations and Presupposition

5.4 T-Evaluations and Pragmatic Not-At-Issue Content

5.5 Conclusion

6. Thick Pragmatics

6.1 T-Evaluations and Parochiality

6.2 T-Evaluations and Communicative Interests

6.3 Three Objections

6.4 More on Parochiality

6.5 The Scope of the Pragmatic View

6.6 Conclusion

7. Thick Concepts and Underdetermination

7.1 Disagreement and Extension

7.2 Underdetermination and Evaluation

7.3 Underdetermination and Gradability

7.4 Explaining Underdetermination+

7.5 Conclusion

8. Shapelessness, Disentanglement and Irreducible Thickness

8.1 The Shapelessness Thesis

8.2 Shapelessness and Outrunning

8.3 The Inseparability Thesis

8.4 Irreducibly Thick Evaluation?

8.5 Conclusion

9. Thick Concepts and Variability

9.1 The Variability Argument

9.2 Variability and Comparative Constructions

9.3 Variability in the Positive Form?

9.4 Variability and the Semantic View

9.5 Variability and Specificity

9.6 Conclusion

10. Thick Concepts: Deflating Significance

10.1 Fact-Value Distinctions

10.2 Normative Reasons

10.3 Reflection and Objectivity

10.4 Beyond the Thick-Thin Distinction

10.5 A Final Summary.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on November 11, 2013).

ISBN:

0-19-936922-4

0-19-931476-4

OCLC:

857645994