Hume's epistemology in the treatise : a veritistic interpretation / Frederick F. Schmitt.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Schmitt, Frederick F., 1951- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Hume, David, 1711-1776.

Hume, David.

Hume, David, 1711-1776--Criticism and interpretation.

Hume, David, 1711-1776. Treatise of human nature.

Knowledge, Theory of--Early works to 1800.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xviii, 423 pages)

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Veritistic interpretation

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Frederick F. Schmitt offers a new account of Hume's epistemology in 'A Treatise of Human Nature', which alternately manifests scepticism, empiricism, and naturalism. Critics have emphasised one of these positions over the others, but Schmitt argues that they can be reconciled by tracing them to an underlying epistemology of knowledge and probability.

Contents:

1.The Epistemological Framework

1.1.The Erosion of Knowledge in Hume's Predecessors

1.2.The Epistemological Framework and its Consequences for Hume's Account of Justified Belief

1.3.Constraints of the Framework and their Implications for the Account of Justified Belief

1.4.What an Account of Justified Belief is

1.5.Defeasible and Overall Justification

1.6.The Broader Historical Background of the Reliability Account of Justified Belief and Veritistic Epistemology

1.7.Conclusion

Preview of the Divisions

Preview of Division I

2.Knowledge (1.3.1)

2.1.Locke on the Psychology of Knowledge

2.2.Locke on the Psychology of Probability

2.3.Locke on the Epistemology of Knowledge, Probability, and Certainty

2.4.Locke on the Epistemology of Certainty and Evidence

2.5.Locke on the Extent of Knowledge

2.6.The Psychology and Extent of Knowledge

2.7.The Certainty of Knowledge

2.8.Infallibility

2.9.The Certainty of Proofs

2.10.Knowledge and Justified Belief

2.11.Applying Knowledge

2.12.One Reliability or Two?

2.13.Conclusion

3.The Natural Function of Beliefs (1.3.10)

3.1.Locke on the Purpose of Judgments

3.2.The Nature of Beliefs

3.3.The Natural Function of Beliefs

3.4.Which Perceptions are Ascribed a Natural Function?

3.5.Which Natural Functions are Ascribed?

3.6.Causal Inference and the Natural Function of Beliefs

3.7.The Natural Function of Beliefs and Veritistic Epistemology

3.8.Conclusion

4.Justified Belief

4.1.'Just' and its Cognates

4.2.The Association of 'Just' and 'True'

4.3.Other Epistemic Terms and Reliability

4.4.Conclusion

Summary of Division I

Preview of Division II

5.Causal Inference (1.3.2, 4, and 6)

5.1.From Lockean Reasoning to Humean Inference

5.2.The Argument that Only Causal Inference Assures Us of Unobserved Existences (1.3.2)

5.3.The Argument that Causal Inference Must Begin with a Sense

Impression (1.3.4)

5.4.The Argument that Causal Inference is Not Lockean Reasoning (1.3.6)

5.5.The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6

5.6.The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying in 1.3.6 and the Reliability Interpretation

5.7.Alleged Evidence for a Sceptical Interpretation of 1.3.6

5.8.The Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying and Part 4 Scepticism

5.9.Conclusion

6.The Justification that Causal Inference is Justifying (1.3.8, 12, and 15)

6.1.The Argument that Causal Inference is Justifying and Evidence for Attributing it

6.2.Supplementary Evidence for Attributing the Conclusion of the Argument

6.3.Towards the Justification of a Revised Premiss (1)

6.4.The Justification of a Revised Premiss (1)

6.5.Against Alternatives to Prospective Reliability

6.6.Is Regulation by a Principle Necessary for Justification?

6.7.Prospective Reliability and the Natural Function of Causal Inference

6.8.The Justification of Probabilities of Causes

6.9.Conclusion

7.Criticizing Causal Inferences and a Criterion of Justifying Causal Inference (1.3.13)

7.1.The Basis for Criticizing Causal Inferences

7.2.Criticizing Causal Inferences in Light of Counterinstances

7.3.Criticizing and Condemning Rash Inferences

7.4.The Opposition Between the Rash Conclusions and Rule 4

7.5.Against the Definitional Interpretation of the Criterion

7.6.The Indication Interpretation of the Criterion

7.7.The Threat of Epistemic Inconsistency

7.8.Conclusion

8.Epistemic Circularity

8.1.The Epistemic Circularity Objection

8.2.Evidence of Hume's Comfort with Epistemically Circular Justification

8.3.The Reliability Interpretation and the Justification of the Assumption that Causal Inference is Justifying

8.4.Epistemic Circularity in a Sceptical Context

8.5.Conclusion

Summary of Division II

Preview of Division III

9.Scepticism about Body (1.4.2)

9.1.The Belief in Body Not Produced by Sense or Reason

9.2.The Inference from Coherence: Not Causal Inference

9.3.The Inference from Coherence and the Propensity to Complete a Uniformity

9.4.The Inference from Coherence: Justifying Power

9.5.The Inference from Constancy and the Idea of Identity

9.6.The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Psychology

9.7.The Vulgar Belief in the Identity of Invariable but Interrupted Impressions: Falsity and Justificatory Status

9.8.The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Psychology

9.9.The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body Justificatory Status

9.10.The Vulgar Belief in Continued and Distinct Body: False

9.11.The Vulgar Belief in Continued Body: Unjustified

9.12.The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Psychology

9.13.The Philosophical Belief in Continued Body: Justificatory Status and Difficulties Peculiar to the Philosophical Belief

9.14.The Permissibility, Necessity, and Utility of the Belief in Body

9.15.Scepticism about Body and Carelessness

9.16.Conclusion

10.The Criterion of Justification and Scepticism about Matter (1.4.4)

10.1.The Charge of Epistemic Inconsistency

10.2.The Criterion of Justification

10.3.Against the Definitional Interpretation of the Criterion

10.4.The Indicator Interpretation of the Criterion

10.5.The Basis for the Criterion

10.6.Applying the Criterion in (Vain) Hope of Resolving the Dispute over Matter

10.7.The Reliability Interpretation and the Manifest Contradiction

10.8.Why Not Defeat?

10.9.Conclusion

Summary of Division III

Preview of Division IV

11.The Reduction of Reason (1.4.1)

11.1.Reducing Knowledge to Probability and then to Suspension of Judgment

11.2.The Norm of Reduction

11.3.Does the Norm of Reduction Derive from the Norms of Probable Inference?

11.4.An Alternative Derivation of the Norm of Reduction

11.5.Difficulties with the Reduction at Stage 3 and Beyond

11.6.The Denial that Anyone Believes Scepticism

11.7.The Case for Scepticism with regard to Reason

11.8.A Possible Reply to the Case for Scepticism

11.9.Conclusion

12.Scepticism and Reason in the Conclusion (1.4.7)

12.1.A Doubt from the General Unreliability of the Imagination

12.2.The Manifest Contradiction

12.3.The Illusion in Causal Ascription

12.4.The Dangerous Dilemma: General Remarks

12.5.The Dangerous Dilemma: A Closer Look

12.6.The Maxim against Refined Reasoning

12.7.Does the Dilemma Defeat Our Positive Evaluation of Limited Reason?

12.8.'Spleen and Indolence'

12.9.From 'Spleen and Indolence' to 'A Serious Good-Humour'd Disposition'

12.10.The Title Principle

12.11.The Consistency of Hume's Evaluations of Causal Inference

12.12.Conclusion

13.The Goal of Philosophy

13.1.The Goal of Philosophy in the Introduction

13.2.The Value of Philosophy in the Conclusion

13.3.Truth versus Permanent Empirical Adequacy as the Goal of Philosophy

13.4.Conclusion

Summary of Division IV.

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-150561-7

OCLC:

922972937