The norm of belief / John Gibbons.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gibbons, John (Associate professor of philosophy), author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Belief and doubt.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Faith.

Practical reason.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xv, 302 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2013]

Language Note:

English

Summary:

John Gibbons presents an account of epistemic normativity. Belief seems to come with a built-in set of standards or norms - truth and reasonableness, for example - but which one is the fundamental norm of belief? He explains both the norms of knowledge and of truth in terms of the fundamental norm, the one that tells you to be reasonable.

Contents:

""Cover""; ""Contents""; ""1. The Puzzle""; ""Subjectivism""; ""Objectivism""; ""The first-person point of view""; ""The ambiguity theory""; ""The last resort: nihilism""; ""Summary""; ""Part I. The Ambiguity Theory""; ""2. Subjective and Objective “Oughts�""; ""The first proposal""; ""The second proposal""; ""The third proposal""; ""One more try""; ""3. Blaming the Question""; ""The regular “ought�""; ""The given""; ""Wide-scoping""; ""Contextualism""; ""Radical contextualism""; ""Incommensurability""; ""Part II. Objectivism""; ""4. The Derivation""; ""Two kinds of objectivists""

""The Bad Attempt""""Williamson""; ""Wedgwood""; ""5. Teleology""; ""The upside""; ""The limitations""; ""The main difficulty""; ""Variations""; ""Part III. The Natural Reaction""; ""6. Guidance""; ""Knowledge only""; ""The natural reaction""; ""Two kinds of guidance""; ""What difference does a mind make?""; ""Getting a grip""; ""Objective reasons to act""; ""Objective reasons to believe""; ""7. Access""; ""The constraint""; ""The regress""; ""Two explanations of privilege""; ""Worldly requirements""; ""Worldly explanations""; ""Explaining privilege""; ""Externalism and the love of Reason""

""The options""""Part IV. Subjectivism""; ""8. Knowledge versus Truth""; ""The practical case""; ""Commitment""; ""Defeaters""; ""Defining undermining""; ""Other possibilities""; ""The aim of belief""; ""The lottery""; ""Why knowledge?""; ""9. Moore""; ""Belief�s own standards""; ""Taking a stand""; ""Commitment""; ""Incoherence without inconsistency""; ""The first pass""; ""The second pass""; ""Back to (O)""; ""What they have in common""; ""Knowledge""; ""Justification""; ""10. The Moore Conditionals""; ""The Moore Conditionals""; ""The objectivist intuitions""; ""General and particular""

""The umbrella""""Inference from a false belief""; ""Moorean redundancy and triviality""; ""One kind of triviality""; ""Noninferential justification""; ""In between following and acting in accord""; ""First Order First""; ""Conclusion""; ""Bibliography""; ""Index""; ""A""; ""B""; ""C""; ""D""; ""E""; ""F""; ""G""; ""H""; ""I""; ""J""; ""K""; ""L""; ""M""; ""N""; ""O""; ""P""; ""Q""; ""R""; ""S""; ""T""; ""U""; ""V""; ""W""; ""Z""

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on August 21, 2013).

Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.

ISBN:

0-19-879105-4

0-19-175168-5

0-19-165436-1

OCLC:

922972419