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Free will, agency, and meaning in life / Derk Pereboom.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Pereboom, Derk, 1957-
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Free will and determinism.
- Responsibility.
- Agent (Philosophy).
- Meaning (Philosophy).
- Life.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (vii, 219 pages)
- Edition:
- First edition.
- Place of Publication:
- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Language Note:
- English
- Summary:
- Derk Pereboom articulates and defends an original, forward-looking conception of moral responsibility. He argues that although we may not possess the kind of free will that is normally considered necessary for moral responsibility, this does not jeopardize our sense of ourselves as agents, or a robust sense of achievement and meaning in life.
- Contents:
- Cover
- Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life
- Copyright
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1: Defending a Source View
- Source views and Frankfurt examples
- A criterion for robustness
- Evading the dilemma defense
- Mere derivative responsibility?
- Robert Kane's plural voluntary control response
- Ginet's timing criticism
- What's the verdict if Jones waits until the last instant?
- Rescuing the difference-making intuition
- 2: Problems for Event-Causal and Non-Causal Libertarianisms
- Three kinds of libertarianism
- The disappearing agent objection to event-causal libertarianism
- Balaguer's event-causal libertarianism
- Non-causal views
- The mixed theory and the second horn of the dilemma for Balaguer's view
- The phenomenological defense
- Randomizing manipulation
- Final thoughts
- 3: The Prospects for Agent-Causal Libertarianism
- Agent-causal libertarianism and luck objections
- Is the agent-causal solution empty?
- Agent causation and rationality
- Contrastive explanations and an expanding agent-causal power
- Is agent-causation reconcilable with the physical laws?
- Conclusion
- 4: A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism
- Compatibilism and how to resist it
- A four-case manipulation argument
- Alfred Mele's objections
- John Fischer's challenge
- McKenna's hard-line reply
- Daniel Haas and rational coercion
- Asymmetry, praiseworthiness, and manipulation
- 5: Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation
- Deliberation and openness
- An epistemic openness requirement
- Belief in the efficacy of deliberation is required in addition
- Objections
- Summary
- 6: Moral Responsibility without Basic Desert
- Free will skepticism and blame
- Blame and obligation
- Blame without the reactive attitudes
- Final words
- 7: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior
- Is criminology insulated from the free will debate?
- Retributivism
- Moral education theory
- Deterrence theories
- Punishment justified by the right to harm in self-defense
- An incapacitation account
- Summary and conclusion 8: Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life
- Can the belief that we have free will be justified pragmatically?
- Relationships and the reactive attitudes
- Guilt and repentance
- Forgiveness
- Gratitude and love
- Life's projects
- Bibliography
- Index of Topics
- Index of Names.
- Notes:
- Description based upon print version of record.
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Description based on print version record.
- Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
- ISBN:
- 0-19-102262-4
- 0-19-877686-1
- 0-19-150872-1
- OCLC:
- 871044412
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