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The secret connexion : causation, realism, and David Hume / by Galen Strawson.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Strawson, Galen, Author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Hume, David, 1711-1776.
Hume, David.
Causation.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (xv, 246 pages)
Edition:
Revised edition.
Other Title:
Secret connection
Causation, realism, and David Hume
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In this revised edition of 'The Secret Connexion', Galen Strawson explores one of the most discussed subjects in philosophy: David Hume's work on causation. He argues that Hume believes in causal influence, but insists that we cannot know its nature. The regularity theory of causation is indefensible, and Hume never adopted it in any case.
Contents:
pt. 1 Meaning, Scepticism, and Reality
1. Introduction
2. The H̀umean' view of causation; and an exegetical principle
3. A summary of the argument
4. Òbjects': preliminaries
5. The untenability of the realist regularity theory of causation
6. Òbjects': complications
6.1. Strict idealism
6.2. Perception-constituted objects and perception-content-constituted objects
6.3. A viable regularity theory of causation
6.4. Hume uncommitted
6.5. Supposing and conceiving
6.6. Basic realism
6.7. Bundles and fiction
6.8. Hume in metaphysical space
6.9. Writing as a realist
Appendix Cartoon-film causation: idealism and the regularity theory of causation
7. The notion of the ultimate nature of reality
Appendix Reality and truth
8. tC̀ausation'
9. Hume's strict scepticism
10. Hume's theory of ideas as applied to the idea of causation
11. The ÀP' property
11.1. The curious idea of a priori causal inference
11.2. An objection
11.3. The objection varied
12. The problem of meaning
12.1. The M̀eaning Tension'
12.2. Experience-transcendent reference: E-intelligibility and R-intelligibility
12.3. Example: Hume on the mind
12.4. Conclusion
13. Èxternal objects' and Causation
13.1. The parallel
13.2. A possible disanalogy
13.3. An objection
pt. 2 Causation in the Treatise
14. Causation in the Treatise: 1
14.1. Introduction
14.2. Referring uses of Causation terms
15. Causation in the Treatise: 2
15.1. Three stratagems
15.2. Ignorance, irony, and reality
15.3. Hume's global subjectivism about necessity
15.4. The ǹecessity, which we ascribe'; the ǹecessity, which we conceive'
15.5. Sò far as we have any notion of it'
15.6. Conclusion
pt. 3 Causation in the Enquiry
16. Enquiry Section 4: the question of irony
17. Enquiry Section 4: Causation and inductive scepticism
18. Enquiry Sections 5
6: undiscovered and undiscoverable
19. Enquiry Section 7: Causation and human beings
19.1. Will and force: a last look at irony
19.2. Resemblance, solidity, and force
19.3. A rhetorical question
20. Enquiry Section 7: the Occasionalists
21. Enquiry Section 7: the two definitions of cause
21.1. Extraordinary ignorance
21.2. The two definitions
21.3. Conclusion
pt. 4 Reason, Reality, and Regularity
22. Reason, Reality, and Regularity
22.1. A summary of Hume's position
22.2. The general form of the argument for Causation
Appendix The Contingent Reality of Natural Necessity
23. The meaning of c̀ause'
23.1. Content: experience and concepts
23.2. The Ànscombean' approach
23.3. The wisdom of nature
23.4. Causation: a non-sensory property.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on April 23, 2014).
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Other Format:
Print version
OCLC:
1336401603

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