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Ethics without principles / Jonathan Dancy.

Oxford Scholarship Online: Philosophy Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Dancy, Jonathan, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Ethics.
Principle (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (x, 229 pages)
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2004.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Jonathan Dancy presents a long-awaited exposition and defence of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. He argues that the traditional link between morality and principles, or between being moral and having principles, is little more than a mistake. The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. Dancy grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is areason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reasons are no different in this resp
Contents:
1. What are the options?
2. Contributory reasons
3. Beyond favouring
4. Dropping the catch
5. Holism and its consequences
6. Can holism be true?
7. Competing pictures
8. Knowing reasons
9. Intrinsic and extrinsic value
10. Are there organic unities?
11. Rationality, value, and meaning
12. Principles of rational valuing.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [216]-224) and index.
Description based on print version record.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
ISBN:
0-19-929768-1
1-282-00730-0
9786612007309
0-19-153357-2
OCLC:
79896301

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