Regard for reason in the moral mind / Joshua May.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

May, Joshua, author.

Contributor:

Class of 1932 Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Judgment (Ethics).

Ethics.

Physical Description:

xiii, 264 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

The burgeoning science of ethics has fostered pessimism about moral thought and action: we're told that they are driven by arbitrary factors and unreasoned feelings. Joshua May argues compellingly that this pessimism is not justified: moral judgment and motivation are fundamentally rational enterprises not beholden to the passions.

Contents:

1 Empirical Pessimism p. 3

1.2 Pessimism about Moral Cognition p. 5

1.3 Pessimism about Moral Motivation p. 14

1.4 Optimistic Rationalism p. 18

1.5 Coda: Appealing to Science p. 22

Part I Moral Judgment & Knowledge

2 The Limits of Emotion p. 27

2.2 Moralizing with Feelings? p. 28

2.3 Accounting for Slight Amplification p. 38

2.4 Psychopathology p. 44

3 Reasoning beyond Consequences p. 54

3.3 Beyond Consequences p. 58

3.4 Moral Inference p. 70

4 Defending Moral Judgment p. 81

4.2 Empirical Debunking in Ethics p. 82

4.3 The Debunker's Dilemma p. 84

4.4 Emotions p. 86

4.5 Framing Effects p. 88

4.6 Evolutionary Pressures p. 93

4.7 Automatic Emotional Heuristics p. 98

4.8 Explaining the Dilemma p. 103

5 The Difficulty-of Moral Knowledge p. 107

5.2 The Threat of Selective Debunking p. 108

5.3 The Threat of Peer Disagreement p. 116

Part II Moral Motivation & Virtue

6 Beyond Self-Interest p. 133

6.2 The Egoism-Altruism Debate p. 135

6.3 Empirical Evidence for Altruism p. 137

6.4 Self-Other Merging p. 144

6.5 Dividing Self from Other p. 148

7 The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs p. 154

7.2 Ante Hoc Rationalization p. 155

7.3 Rationalizing Immorality p. 160

7.4 Motivating Virtue p. 171

8 Freeing Reason from Desire p. 178

8.2 Anti-Humean Moral Integrity p. 180

8.3 Neurological Disorders p. 182

8.4 Special Mechanisms p. 188

8.5 Aspects of Desire p. 192

8.6 Simplicity p. 195

9 Defending Virtuous Motivation p. 199

9.2 The Defeater Dilemma p. 200

9.3 The Threat of Egoism p. 203

9.4 The Threat of Situationism p. 209

9.5 Containing the Threats p. 220

10 Cautious Optimism p. 227

10.3 Enhancing Moral Motivation p. 230

10.4 Enhancing Moral Cognition p. 234.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-259) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Class of 1932 Fund.

ISBN:

0198811578

9780198811572

OCLC:

1013820391