What it is like to perceive : direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception / J. Christopher Maloney.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Maloney, J. Christopher, author.

Contributor:

Class of 1932 Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Perception (Philosophy).

Mental representation.

Intentionalism.

Realism.

Physical Description:

xxiv, 360 pages ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2018]

Contents:

1 What Is What It Is Like? p. xiii

2 Initial Assumptions p. xv

3 Intentionalism and Higher Order Theory p. xvi

4 Advertisement of Direct Realism p. xviii

5 The Hypothesis of the Extended Mind p. xxi

6 Disjunctivism Denied p. xxii

1 Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive Content p. 1

1 What Is What It Is Like? p. 1

2 Qualitative versus Subjective Character p. 4

3 The Forks of Intentionalism: Reductive and Not p. 6

4 Intentionalism's Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content p. 9

4.1 Tense and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content p. 10

4.2 The Rich Content Thesis and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual Content p. 14

4.3 The Master Argument Bedeviling Intentionalism p. 15

2 Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation p. 19

1 The Cognitive Face of Experience p. 19

2 Representations and Propositions p. 22

3 Minimal and Maximal Intentionalism p. 26

4 Intentionalism and Perceptual Attitudes p. 28

5 Getting the Given from the Gotten p. 30

5.1 The Supervenience of Character on Content p. 34

5.2 The Identification of Phenomenal Character with Perceptual Content p. 37

3 Intentionalism's Troubles Begin p. 40

1 Intentionalism's Puzzling Exportation of Phenomenal Character p. 40

2 Two Questions for Intentionalism p. 42

2.1 Coincident Perceptual Content but Divergent Phenomenal Character p. 44

2.2 Perceptual Content p. 45

3 Byrne's Argument for Minimal Intentionalism p. 49

4 Objections to Byrne's Argument p. 51

4.1 Recurrent Content and Attitude Proliferation p. 53

4.2 Reasoning within Experience p. 55

4 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content p. 58

1 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content p. 58

2 Plenitudinous versus Parsimonious Perceptual Content p. 60

2.1 Attention and Smudge p. 61

2.2 Mnemonic Amplification p. 66

2.3 Memory Systems p. 67

2.4 Idle Mnemonic Residue p. 69

3 Fine-Grained Content p. 71

3.1 Concepts as Constituents of Mental Representations p. 73

3.2 Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content p. 75

3.3 Nonconceptual Content as Immature Conceptual Content p. 76

3.4 Poised Perceptual Content p. 86

4 Fineness of Grain Reconsidered p. 90

4.1 Cognitively Penetrable Perception p. 90

4.2 Cognitive Penetration and Cognitive Rehearsal p. 94

5 Sperling on Perception and Memory p. 95

5.1 Sperling's Hypothesis and Intentionalism p. 101

5.2 Sperling's Hypothesis Rejected p. 103

5.3 Mnemonic Preservation p. 106

5.4 Phillips on Postdiction p. 107

5.5 Reply to Phillips p. 109

5 Higher Order Theory p. 111

1 Representations Represented p. 111

1.1 Is Phenomenal Character Relational? p. 112

1.2 Thinking about Perceiving p. 116

2 Transparency and Higher Order Theory (HOT) p. 117

3 Unconscious Perception p. 119

3.1 Unconscious or Forgotten Experience? p. 120

3.2 Unsuffered Phenomenal Character p. 121

3.3 On Behalf of Mnemonic Lapse p. 126

4 Unconscious Phenomenal Character p. 127

5 Rosenthal's Rendition of Higher Order Theory p. 132

5.1 First Order versus Higher Order Mental Representations p. 133

5.2 Overt versus Covert HOT Production p. 137

5.3 The Attractions of Rosenthal's Higher Order Theory p. 142

6 Objections to Higher Order Theory p. 144

6.1 Goldman against Relationally Determined Phenomenal Character p. 144

6.2 Impossible Phenomenal Character p. 146

6.3 Bogus Phenomenal Character p. 149

6.4 Recurrent HOTs without Recurrent Phenomenal Character p. 150

6 Dual Aspect Theory p. 152

1 Carruthers on Consciousness p. 152

1.1 The Dual Functions of Perception p. 154

1.2 Dual Representation p. 156

1.3 Unconscious Perception and the Unemployed Attitude Manager p. 158

1.4 A Brief Interlude on Narrow-Content p. 159

1.5 Narrow Dual Content of the Attitude Manager's Representations p. 166

1.5.1 The Narrow-Content of HOT-RED p. 168

1.5.2 The Narrow-Content of RED p. 168

1.5.3 Sufferance of Phenomenal Character According to Dual-Content Theory p. 169

1 Objections to Dual-Content Theory p. 172

2.1 Cognitive Ambiguity p. 172

2.2 Dual Narrow-Content for the Movement Manager p. 176

2.3 Logical Structure and Phenomenal Character p. 180

2.4 Disjunctive First Order Content p. 181

2.5 Dissolved Dispositions and Persistent Phenomenal Character p. 183

2.6 Actors in Representational Roles p. 185

7 Direct Realism and the Extended Mind p. 188

1 A Fresh Representationalist Theory of Phenomenal Character p. 188

2 The Representational Theory of Mind Revisited and Revised p. 192

3 Demonstrative Reference and the Hypothesis of the Extended Mind p. 195

3.1 Demonstrative Reference in Perception p. 196

3.2 Perceptual Demonstratives p. 203

3.3 The Hypothesis of the Extended Mind p. 205

4 The Phenomenal Character of Perceptual Experience According to Direct Realism p. 212

5 Self-Representation p. 217

6 Direct Realism Depicted p. 219

7 Some Reasons Favorable to Direct Realism p. 223

7.1 The Best Explanation of Phenomenal Character p. 224

7.2 Phenomenal Character, Transparency, and Direct Realism p. 226

8 Acquaintance and the Objective Character of Perception p. 228

9 Phenomenal Similarity, Change Blindness, and Direct Realism p. 233

10 Objections to Direct Realism p. 238

8 Direct Realism and Illusion p. 240

1 Illusion p. 240

1.1 Conditions of Observation p. 241

1.2 The Conjecture of Relative Property Identity p. 247

1.3 Demonstrative Predication in Perception p. 249

1.4 Inference, Conceptualization, and Recognition p. 253

1.4.1 Rudimentary and Sophisticated Perceptual Conceptualization p. 253

1.4.2 Inference and Perceptual Conceptualization p. 255

2 Neo-Whorfian Perceptual Conceptualization p. 260

2.1 Neo-Whorfian Conceptual Ascension p. 266

2.2 Mitigating Perceptual Conceptualization p. 270

2.3 How Conditions of Observation Mitigate Perceptual Conceptualization p. 273

2.4 Logically Sophisticated Perceptual Conceptualization p. 277

3 Aspect Alteration p. 281

9 Direct Realism and Hallucination p. 287

1 Hallucination and Thoughts about Nonexistents p. 287

1.1 Fictivism p. 288

1.2 Disjunctivism p. 292

2 Problems for Fictivism and Disjunctivism p. 295

2.1 Fictivism's Problems p. 295

2.2 Disjunctivism's Problems p. 297

3 Selective Eliminativism on Behalf of Direct Acquaintance p. 303

3.1 Selective Eliminativism Advertised p. 305

3.2 Selective Eliminativism and the Proper Conception of Hallucination p. 309

4 Hallucination Properly Conceived p. 311

4.1 Hallucination and a Scene's Census p. 311

4.2 Macbeth's Dagger p. 315

4.3 Veridical Hallucination p. 318

4.4 E Pluribus Unum p. 320

4.5 Perception and the Past p. 324

5 Inverted and Absent Phenomenal Character p. 327

6 Blindsight p. 330

6.1 Blindsight and Internal Perceptual Representation p. 330

6.2 Blindsight and Unacknowledged Awareness p. 334

7 Subliminal Priming and Unconscious Perception p. 335.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Class of 1932 Fund.

ISBN:

9780190854751

0190854758

OCLC:

1027821159