Making morality work / Holly M. Smith.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Smith, Holly M., author.

Contributor:

Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Conduct of life.

Physical Description:

xiv, 410 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018.

Summary:

What should we do if we cannot figure what morality requires of us? Holly M. Smith argues that the best moral codes solve this problem by offering two tiers, one of which tells us what makes acts right and wrong, and the other of which provides user-friendly decision guides. She opens a path towards resolving a deep problem of moral life.

Contents:

2 Using Moral Principles to Guide Decisions p. 11

2.1 Using Moral Principles to Guide Conduct p. 11

2.2 Two Different Kinds of Usability p. 12

2.3 Immediately Helpful Descriptions p. 15

2.4 Issues and Implications p. 23

2.4.1 The time and scope of a principle's usability p. 23

2.4.2 Moral ignorance or uncertainty p. 24

2.4.3 Beliefs and credences p. 25

2.4.4 Unconscious beliefs p. 26

2.4.5 Occurrent versus dispositional beliefs p. 27

2.4.6 Mental representation of a moral principle p. 28

2.4.7 Decision procedures p. 30

3 Impediments to Usability: Error, Ignorance, and Uncertainty p. 33

3.1 The Theoretical and Practical Domains of a Moral Principle p. 33

3.2 The Impact of Cognitive Limitations on our Ability to Use Moral Principles in Making Decisions: Let Us Count the Ways p. 36

3.2.1 The problem of unintelligibility p. 37

3.2.2 The problem of error regarding nonmoral facts p. 38

3.2.3 The problem of uncertainty about nonmoral facts p. 39

3.2.4 The problem of ignorance of nonmoral facts p. 41

3.2.5 The problem of computational constraints p. 42

3.2.6 The problem of moral error p. 44

3.2.7 The problems of moral uncertainty and ignorance p. 44

3.2.8 The problems of meta-moral uncertainty and error p. 45

3.3 Responses to Failures of Usability p. 47

3.4 Rationales for the Usability Demand p. 53

3.4.1 Usability required by the concept of morality p. 53

3.4.2 Usability required for justice p. 55

3.4.3 Usability required in order for morality to enhance social welfare p. 56

3.4.4 Usability required for the production of the best pattern of actions p. 57

3.4.5 Further considerations p. 58

4 Pragmatic Responses to the Problem of Error p. 60

4.1 The Problem of Error p. 60

4.2 Merits of the Pragmatic Response as a Response to the Problem of Error p. 62

4.2.1 Conceptual advantages of error-free codes p. 64

4.2.2 Goal-oriented advantages: enhancement of social welfare p. 64

4.2.3 Goal-oriented advantages: the special social role of morality p. 65

4.2.4 Goal-oriented advantages: ideal patterns of action p. 67

4.3 Achieving Universal Error-Freedom by Pragmatic Responses p. 67

4.4 Achieving Universal Error-Freedom by More Radical Means: Laundry List Codes p. 70

4.5 Achieving Universal Error-Freedom by More Radical Means: Subjectivized Codes p. 77

4.5.1 Possible conceptual advantages of subjectivized moral codes p. 79

4.5.2 Possible goal-oriented advantages of subjectivized moral codes p. 84

4.6 The Splintered Pragmatic Response p. 86

5 A Further Disadvantage of Subjectivized Moral Codes p. 90

5.1 The Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting p. 91

5.2 Three Caveats p. 92

5.3 Epistemic Duties p. 93

5.4 The Duty to Acquire Information before Action: Objective Moral Theories p. 94

5.5 The Duty to Acquire Information: Subjectivized Moral Theories p. 105

5.5.1 The duty to gather information in subjectivized welfare-maximizing codes p. 105

5.5.2 The duty to gather information in subjectivized codes that include deontic duties: free-standing duties p. 106

5.5.3 The duty to gather information in subjectivized codes that include deontic duties: derivative duties p. 107

5.5.4 A problem for this approach, and the solution p. 110

5.5.5 Extension of Principle P_SD to cases of uncertainty p. 115

5.5.6 Reasonable belief versions of the subjectivized duty to investigate p. 117

5.5.7 Summary for subiectivized deontic theories p. 119

5.5.8 Implications for objective deontological codes p. 119

5.5.9 Upshot: subjectivized deontic moral codes cannot appropriately underwrite the duty to gather information prior to acting p. 122

6 Non-Ideal Pragmatic Responses to the Problem of Error p. 126

6.1 Denning "Greater Usability" p. 127

6.2 ACIoser Look at "Usability" p. 132

6.2.1 Comparing the value of usability in more and less important principles p. 132

6.2.2 Comparing the value of usability in principles having better or worse content p. 135

6.2.3 Further refinement of the notion of deontic value p. 139

6.2.4 Combining the content merit and weight merit of codes and principles p. 140

6.2.5 Tying up a loose end: assigning weights to imperfect principles p. 145

6.2.6 Tying up further loose ends: potentially controversial implications of our proposals p. 147

6.2.7 Introducing usability weight p. 148

6.2.8 Combining usability weight and usability into usability value p. 149

6.2.9 The extended usability value of a code p. 153

7 Assessing Non-Ideal Pragmatic Responses to the Problem of Error p. 156

7.1 Problems for the Non-Ideal Pragmatic Approach p. 157

7.2 Conceptual Advantages of Codes with Higher Usability Values p. 163

7.2.1 The conceptual advantage of usability per se p. 163

7.2.2 The conceptual advantage of securing justice p. 165

7.3 Goal-Oriented Rationales for Usability p. 166

7.3.1 Enhancing social welfare p. 166

7.3.2 The special social role for morality in enhancing consensus and cooperation p. 169

7.3.3 Fostering ideal patterns of action p. 172

7.4 Non-Ideal Splintered Pragmatic Responses p. 177

8 Hybrid and Austere Responses to the Problem of Error p. 182

8.1 Hybrid Approaches p. 182

8.1.1 Ideal Hybrid approaches p. 184

8.1.2 Non-ideal Hybrid approaches p. 187

8.2 Austere Approaches p. 191

8.2.1 Must a moral code be usable? p. 192

8.2.2 Must a code make the successful moral life available to everyone? p. 196

8.2.3 The argument for enhancing social welfare p. 202

8.2.4 The argument from ideal patterns of action p. 203

9 The Problems of Ignorance and Uncertainty p. 207

9.1 Defining the Problem of ignorance and the Problem of Uncertainty p. 208

9.1.1 The problem of ignorance p. 208

9.1.2 The problem of uncertainty p. 212

9.2 Addressing the Problem of Uncertainty p. 214

9.2.1 Feasible joint solutions to the problems of error and uncertainty p. 217

9.2.2 Evaluation of systems of type E: Austere approaches to both the problem of error and the problem of uncertainty p. 218

9.2.3 Evaluation of systems of type D: conjoining Austere solutions to the problem of error with Pragmatic solutions to the problem of uncertainty p. 219

9.2.4 Evaluation of systems of type F: conjoining Austere solutions to the problem of error with Hybrid solutions to tlie problem of uncertainty p. 225

10 The Hybrid Solution to the Problems of Error and Uncertainty p. 232

10.1 Criteria of Adequacy for a Hybrid System p. 232

10.2 Proposed Decision-Guides for C* p. 235

10.2.1 Decision-Guide 1: Perform the act most likely to be right p. 236

10.2.2 Decision-Guide 2: Perform the act that would maximize expected value p. 237

10.2.3 Decision-Guide 3: Try to perform the obligatory act p. 241

10.2.4 Feldman's Level 2 Decision-Guide p. 242

10.2.5 Pollock's decision-guide p. 245

10.3 Conclusion: Rejection of Hybrid Systems with a Single Primary Decision-Guide p. 250

11 Multiple-Rule Hybrid Solutions to the Problems of Error and Uncertainty p. 253

11.1 Multiple-Rule Decision-Guiding Codes p. 253

11.2 Avoiding Inconsistent Prescriptions p. 256

11.3 Sample Hybrid Multi-Decision-Guide Systems p. 258

11.4 Interpolated Decision-Guides p. 265

11.5 A Profusion of Normative Act-Evaluations p. 267

11.6 How Usable Must the Decision-Guides Be? p. 270

11.7 A New Opening for the Pragmatic Approach? p. 271

12 Developing the Hybrid Solution p. 277

12.1 Indirect Use of a Top-Tier Code or Principle p. 278

12.1.1 Indirect inferences p. 278

12.1.2 Beliefs based on the advice of others p. 283

12.1.3 Unconscious beliefs p. 286

12.2 A Deeper Look at Beliefs about the Highest Usable Decision-Guide p. 288

12.2.1 False beliefs about the highest usable decision-guide p. 288

12.2.2 Uncertainty about the highest usable decision-guide p. 288

a First approach: As a condition for indirect usability, do not require an agent to have moral beliefs about which decision-guide is correct p. 293

b Second approach: As a condition for indirect usability, require an agent to have credences about which decision-guide is correct p. 296

12.3 The Second Form of Uncertainty about which Decision-Guide is Best p. 305

13 Assessing the Hybrid Solution p. 308

13.1 Filling out the Expanded Moral Theory Approach p. 309

13.1.1 The decision-mandated act p. 309

13.1.2 Redefining indirect usability p. 309

13.1.3 Issues for Definition 13,2 of ability to indirectly use a moral theory for guidance p. 320

13.2 Third Approach: As a Condition for Indirect Usability, Require an Agent to Have Credences about Which Decision-Guide is Correct, and Make this Possible by Constraining the Standard for Guides p. 326

13.3 The Status of Decision-Guides p. 332

13.4 Limitations of the Constrained Standards Approach p. 333

13.4.1 Agents' credences short of full belief that a decision-guide is objectively right p. 334

13.4.2 Moral nihilism about decision-guides p. 334

13.4.3 Uncertainty all the way down p. 335

13.4.4 Uncertainty about one's own beliefs p. 336

13.4.5 Impoverished awareness of what decision-guides are available p. 336

13.4.6 Strategies for remedying these problems p. 336

13.4.7 Upshot p. 340

13.5 Is the Constrained Standards Hybrid Approach itself too Epistemically Demanding? p. 341.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 385-397) and indexes.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

ISBN:

0199560080

9780199560080

OCLC:

1013822989