Experienced wholeness : integrating insights from Gestalt theory, cognitive neuroscience, and predictive processing / Wanja Wiese.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Wiese, Wanja, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Consciousness.

Phenomenology.

Gestalt psychology.

Cognitive neuroscience.

Inference.

Physical Description:

xvi, 352 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2018]

Summary:

An interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterizations can be analyzed computationally.How can we account for phenomenal unity? That is, how can we characterize and explain our experience of objects and groups of objects, bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness as wholes? In this book, Wanja Wiese develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity, investigating how experiential wholes can be characterized and how such characterization can be analyzed conceptually as well as computationally. Wiese first addresses how the unity of consciousness can be characterized phenomenologically, discussing what it is like to experience wholes and what is the experiential contribution of phenomenal unity. Considering the associated conceptual and empirical issues, he draws connections to phenomenological accounts and research on Gestalt theory. The results show how the attentional structure of experience, the experience of temporal flow, and different types of experiential wholes contribute to our sense of phenomenal unity. Moreover, characterizing phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global phenomenal state is neither necessary nor sufficient to adequately address the problem of phenomenal unity. Wiese then suggests that the concepts and ideas of predictive processing can be used to analyze phenomenal unity computationally.

Contents:

I Setting the Scene 1

1 Introduction 3

1.1 A Brief Sketch of the Account Developed and Defended in This Book 3

1.2 Reflection on Methods 6

1.2.1 Why an Interdisciplinary Account? 6

1.2.2 How Is an Interdisciplinary Account of Phenomenal Unity Possible? 7

1.3 Phenomenal Unity and Access Unity 8

1.3.1 What Aspects of Conscious Experience Are Accessible in the First Place? 8

1.3.2 Access Unity 9

1.4 Why Anti-Representationalists Should Read This Book 10

2 Framing the Problem of Phenomenal Unity (PPU) 11

2.1 Basic Conceptual Considerations 11

2.1.1 What Is a Phenomenal Field? 12

2.1.2 What Is a Phenomenal Part? 13

2.1.3 What Is a Subject of Experience? 18

2.1.4 The First and the Second Problems of Phenomenal Unity 18

2.2 Diachronic and Synchronic Unity 20

2.3 Core Constraints on Accounts of Phenomenal Unity 26

2.3.1 Constraint 1: Phenomenality 27

2.3.2 Constraint 2: Globality 28

2.3.3 Constraint 3: Necessity 29

2.4 Interim Conclusion 30

II The First Problem of Phenomenal Unity 31

3 Why the Single State Conception Does Not Solve the Problem of Phenomenal Unity 33

3.1 The Single State Conception (SSC) 33

3.2 SSC Creates Avoidable Problems 35

3.3 SSC Does Not Solve PPU 38

3.3.1 Tim Bayne's Account of Phenomenal Unity Does Not Solve 1PPU 39

3.3.2 The Metaphysical Digression Suggested by Bayne's Account Is a Dead End 44

3.4 Interim Conclusion 50

4 What Is It Like to Experience a Third Man? The Phenomenological Bradley and How to Solve It 51

4.1 The Phenomenological Bradley: A Phenomenological Dual to Bradley's Regress 51

4.2 Phenomenal Fundament 57

4.2.1 Short Description 57

4.2.2 Historical Precursors 59

4.3 Phenomenal Glue 62

4.3.1 Short Description 62

4.3.2 A Historical Precursor and One Current Account 64

4.4 Phenomenal Replacement 69

4.4.1 Short Description 69

4.4.2 Historical Precursors and One Current Account 70

4.5 Phenomenal Disposition 77

4.5.1 Short Description 77

4.5.2 One Historical Precursor and Two Current Accounts 80

4.6 The Mélange Model: Integrating Different Solutions 86

4.7 Interim Conclusion 93

5 Think Globally, Experience Locally? 95

5.1 Understanding Globality 96

5.2 Holism and Consciousness 101

5.2.1 Michael Esfeld's Generic Holism 101

5.2.2 Holistic Theories of Consciousness 104

5.3 Strong Phenomenal Holism? 104

5.3.1 Aristotle: Dynamic Unity 106

5.3.2 Max Wertheimer: Principles of Perceptual Organization 107

5.3.3 Aron Gurwitsch: Whole-Parts 108

5.3.4 Elijah Chudnoff's Phenomenal Holism 110

5.3.5 John Searle on Building Block and Unified Field Theories 114

5.3.6 Tim Bayne on Atomistic and Holistic Theories of Consciousness 117

5.3.7 Barry Dainton's Phenomenal Holism 119

5.4 The Plausible Alternative: Relax and Go Hierarchical 122

5.5 Multiplicity 124

5.5.1 The Intuition 124

5.5.2 Historical Precursors and Relations to Existing Accounts 124

5.5.3 Summary 128

5.6 Graduality 128

5.6.1 The Intuition 128

5.6.2 Historical Precursors and Relations to Existing Accounts 129

5.6.3 Summary 137

5.7 Invariance 139

5.7.1 The Intuition 139

5.7.2 Historical Precursors and Relations to Existing Accounts 139

5.7.3 Summary 146

5.8 The Regularity Account of Phenomenal Unity 146

5.8.1 An Important Precursor: Thomas Metzinger's Convolved Holism 147

5.8.2 The Core Idea: Generalizing the Law of Common Fate 148

5.9 Interim Conclusion 152

III The Second Problem of Phenomenal Unity 155

6 Representational Holism 157

6.1 What Is the Representationalist Level of Description? 158

6.2 Global Self-Representations 160

6.2.1 Robert van Gulick: Higher-Order Global States 160

6.2.2 Uriah Kriegel: Cross-Order Integration 163

6.2.3 Carolyn Jennings: Perceptual Organization 166

6.2.4 Thomas Metzinger: What Is a Phenomenal Point of View? 167

6.3 What Are the Potential Benefits of a Hierarchy of Wholes? 174

6.3.1 Types of Efficiency Associated with a Hierarchy of Wholes 177

6.3.2 Segregation and Integration 181

6.4 Operationalizing Representational Holism: Causal Density, Integrated Information, and Related Measures 186

6.5 Interim Conclusion 190

7 Predictive Processing 191

7.1 Basics of Predictive Processing 191

7.2 PP and Karl Friston's Free-Energy Principle 194

7.3 PP and Bayesian Inference 197

7.4 PP and Active Inference 201

7.5 PP and Its Relation to Action and Perception 205

7.6 PP and Representationalism 207

7.6.1 Are Hierarchical Generative Models in PP Genuine Representations? 207

7.6.2 Ramsey's Job Description Challenge-Using Vehicles of Contents as Representations 208

7.6.3 The Content Challenge 209

7.6.4 What Is the Structural Concept of Representational Content? 211

7.6.5 PP Entails a Structural Resemblance between Processes in the World and Processes in the Brain 215

7.6.6 The Hierarchical Generative Model Plays a Representational Role 217

7.6.7 How Are Particular Contents Determined? 219

7.7 PP and the Veil of Perception 223

7.8 Interim Conclusion 227

8 Consciousness and Predictive Processing 229

8.1 PP and Attention 231

8.1.1 Predictive Weight Watching 231

8.1.2 Endogenous and Exogenous Attention 233

8.1.3 Is Volitional Attention Special? 234

8.1.4 Volitional Attention and the Contents of Consciousness 238

8.1.5 Precision Estimates and Affective Value 243

8.2 Jakob Hohwy on PP and Conscious Perception 245

8.3 PP and Theories of Consciousness 248

8.3.1 Global Workspace Theories 248

8.3.2 Attention Schema Theory 250

8.3.3 Precision, the Global Workspace, and the Phenomenal Point of View 252

8.3.4 Integrated Information Theory 255

8.4 Interim Conclusion 257

9 The Regularity Account of Phenomenal Unity 259

9.1 Introducing RPU 259

9.1.1 Example 1: Auditory Regularities 260

9.1.2 Example 2: Visual Regularities 260

9.1.3 From Gestalt Laws to Predictive Regularities 261

9.2 What Is a Regularity? 263

9.2.1 An Informal Characterization 263

9.2.2 A Formal Characterization 264

9.2.3 A Possible Neural Implementation 265

9.2.4 A Hierarchy of Regularities 266

9.2.5 Regularities and Invariance 269

9.2.6 The Role of Counterfactuals 269

9.3 A Hierarchy of Wholes 270

9.3.1 Feature Binding 273

9.3.2 Sensorimotor Integration 274

9.3.3 Multisensory Integration 276

9.3.4 Intramodal Perceptual Grouping 278

9.3.5 Intermodal Perceptual Grouping 278

9.3.6 Synesthesia 280

9.3.7 Crossmodal Correspondences 283

9.3.8 Emotions 284

9.3.9 Volitional Attention 287

9.4 A Formal Analysis of the Mélange Model 288

9.5 Which Constraints Are Satisfied by RPU? 290

9.5.1 Phenomenality 290

9.5.2 Globality 291

9.5.3 Necessity 292

9.6 Implications of RPU 292

9.6.1 States of Decreased Wholeness 292

9.6.2 States of Increased Wholeness 294

9.6.3 Attention Does Not Correlate with Wholeness 296

9.7 Interim Conclusion 297

10 Putting It All Together 299

10.1 A Selective Summary 299

10.2 Suggestions for Future Research 303.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780262036993

0262036991

OCLC:

978286383