On folk epistemology : how we think and talk about knowledge / Mikkel Gerken.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gerken, Mikkel, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

xv, 332 pages ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.

Summary:

On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this book develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the empirical study of folk epistemology. Book jacket.

Contents:

Part I Puzzles

1 Thought and Talk about Knowledge 9

1 Knowledge Ascriptions and Their Communicative Roles 9

1.1 Knowledge ascriptions; first approximations 9

1.2 The roles of knowledge ascriptions 15

1.3 Concluding remarks 18

2 Puzzling Patterns of Knowledge Ascriptions 20

2 The Sources of the Challenges to Traditional Epistemology 20

2.1 Intuitive judgments: some distinctions 20

2.2 The Bank case pair 22

2.3 Salient alternative effects 24

2.4 Contrast effects 30

2.5 Practical factor effects 34

2.6 Concluding remarks 43

3 Theoretical Responses and Methodology 44

3 Theory and Data 44

3.1 Theoretical responses to the three effects 44

3.2 Challenges from intuitive judgments, principles, and functions 51

3.3 Intuitive judgments and philosophical methodology 56

3.4 Concluding methodological remarks on the challenges 65

4 Arguments for Strict Purist Invariantism 66

4 Epistemology First 66

4.1 Salient alternative effects and false negatives 66

4.2 Contrast effects and false positives 74

4.3 Practical factor effects and their problems 80

4.4 The force of philosophy 91

Part II Resources

5 The Psychology of Knowledge Ascriptions 95

5 The Cognitive Basis of Knowledge Ascriptions 95

5.1 The psychology of intuitive judgment 95

5.2 Heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 97

5.3 Knowledge ascriptions and cognitive heuristics 100

5.4 Dual process theory and levels of processing 107

5.5 Knowledge ascriptions and mental state ascriptions 113

5.6 Epistemic focal bias: the basic account 116

5.7 Epistemic focal bias, levels of processing, and stereotypes 121

5.8 The psychology of folk epistemology 123

6 The Epistemic Norms of Action 125

6 The Epistemic Norms of Action and Practical Deliberation 125

6.1 Epistemic standards, norms, and guidelines 125

6.2 Epistemic norms of action 130

6.3 Objections to the knowledge norm of action 137

6.4 Responses and further objections 149

6.5 Folk epistemology and the epistemic norms of action 154

7 The Epistemic Norms of Assertion 156

7.1 Assertion and epistemic normativity 156

7.2 Objections to the knowledge norm of assertion 162

7.3 Epistemic norms, pragmatics, and knowledge ascriptions 170

7.4 Folk epistemology and the norms of assertion 177

8 Cognition and Communication: Toward a Unified Account 178

8 Knowledge Ascriptions and Pragmatics 178

8.1 Things we do with the word 'knowledge' 178

8.2 Conversational pragmatics 180

8.3 Cognitive pragmatics and knowledge ascriptions 186

8.4 Folk epistemology and cognitive pragmatics 194

Part III Diagnoses

9 Staging a Strict Purist Invariantist Comeback 197

9 Defending Strict Purist Invariantism 197

9.1 Methodological doubts about genealogies and functional roles 197

9.2 Against functional role accounts 199

9.3 Pandora's Dilemma 208

9.4 Concluding considerations 214

10 Diagnosing Salient Alternative Effects 215

10 Salient Alternative Effects 215

10.1 Psychological bias accounts 215

10.2 The epistemic focal bias account 218

10.3 Related psychological biases 224

10.4 The power and limits of cognitive bias accounts 231

10.5 Linguistic considerations 236

10.6 Concluding remarks on salient alternative effects 240

11 Diagnosing Contrast Effects 241

11 Contrast Effects 241

11.1 Psychological bias accounts 241

11.2 The epistemic focal bias account 243

11.3 Experimental support 246

11.4 Further psychological considerations 251

11.5 Linguistic considerations 253

11.6 Concluding remarks on contrast effects 258

12 Diagnosing Practical Factor Effects 260

12 Practical Factor Effects 260

12.1 Explananda and desiderata 260

12.2 Psychological considerations 263

12.3 A psychological account of mental practical factor effects 268

12.4 Linguistic considerations 273

12.5 The directive force account 278

12.6 Objections and responses 282

12.7 Extensions and integrations 286

12.8 Concluding remarks on practical factor effects 290

Coda: Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Injustice 292

C.1 Folk epistemology and beyond 292

C.2 Consequences for epistemology 292

C.3 Consequences for epistemic injustice 294

C.4 Final remark 296.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 303-323) and indexes.

ISBN:

0198803451

9780198803454

OCLC:

990442264