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The value of rationality / Ralph Wedgwood.

LIBRA B833 .W356 2017
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Wedgwood, Ralph, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Reason.
Rationalism.
Physical Description:
vii, 267 pages ; 24 cm
Edition:
First edition.
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017.
Summary:
Ralph Wedgwood gives a general account of the concept of rationality. 'The Normativity of Rationality' is designed as the first instalment of a trilogy - to be followed by accounts of the requirements of rationality that apply specifically to beliefs and choices. The central claim of the book is that rationality is a normative concept. This claim is defended against some recent objections. Normative concepts are to be explained in terms of values (not in terms of 'ought' or reasons). Rationality is itself a value: rational thinking is in a certain way better than irrational thinking. Specifically, rationality is an internalist concept: what it is rational for you to think now depends solely on what is now present in your mind. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal - the goal of thinking correctly, or getting things right in one's thinking. The connection between thinking rationally and thinking correctly is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is in effect bad news about your thinking's degree of correctness. This account of rationality explains how we should set about giving a theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational. Wedgwood thus unifies practical and theoretical rationality, and reveals the connections between formal accounts of rationality (such as those of formal epistemologists and decision theorists) and the more metaethics-inspired recent discussions of the normativity of rationality. He does so partly by drawing on recent work in the semantics of normative and modal terms (including deontic modals like 'ought').
Contents:
1 Is Rationality Normative? 25
2 The Beginnings of an Answer 40
3 'Rationally Ought' Implies 'Can' 62
4 The Pitfalls of 'Reasons' 86
5 Objective and Subjective 'Ought' 109
6 Rationality as a Virtue 137
7 Internalism Re-explained 162
8 Why Does Rationality Matter? 196
9 The Aim of Rationality: Correctness 211
10 Conclusion: Looking Ahead 236.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 253-262) and index.
ISBN:
9780198802693
0198802692
OCLC:
974846983

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