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The non-reificatory approach to belief / Richard Floyd.

Van Pelt Library BD418.3 .F56 2017
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Floyd, Richard, author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Philosophy of mind.
Physical Description:
ix, 212 pages ; 22 cm
Place of Publication:
Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2017]
Summary:
This book argues against the mainstream view that we should treat propositional attitudes as internal states, suggesting that to treat beliefs as things of certain sort (i.e. to reify them) is a mistake. The reificatory view faces several problems that the non-reificatory view avoids, and it is argued the non-reificatory view is more faithful to the everyday concept of belief. There are several major reasons why it might be thought that a reificatory approach to mental states is nevertheless unavoidable, but this book attempts to show that none of these reasons is at all convincing; in each case, the evidence is consistent with a non-reificatory view. Having argued that the popularity of the reificatory view is unjustified, the author examines history of psychology and philosophy of mind, and the structure of psychological language, in order to show that this popularity is quite understandable, but mistaken nonetheless.
Contents:
Approaching the mind
Wittgenstein, Ryle, and the language of commonsense psychology
Belief and explanation
Theory-theory, simulation, and self-ascription
The positive account of belief
Where did it all go wrong?
Conclusion.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9783319598727
3319598724
OCLC:
985082216

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