Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics / Peter Lasersohn.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Lasersohn, Peter, author.

Series:

Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8.

Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Perspective (Linguistics).

Subjectivity (Linguistics).

Physical Description:

xviii, 274 pages : illustrations ; 26 cm.

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.

Summary:

"This book explores linguistic and philosophical issues presented by sentences expressing personal taste, such as Roller coasters are fun, or Licorice is tasty. Standard semantic theories explain the meanings of sentences by specifying the conditions under which they are true; here, Peter Lasersohn asks how we can account for sentences that are concerned with matters of opinion rather than matters of fact. He argues that a truth-theoretic semantic theory is appropriate even for sentences like these, but that for such sentences, truth and falsity must be assigned relative to perspectives, rather than absolutely. The book provides a detailed and explicit formal grammar, working out the implications of this conception of truth both for simple sentences and for reports of mental attitude. The semantic analysis is paired with a pragmatic theory explaining what it means to assert a sentence which is true or false only relativistically, and with a speculative account of the functional motivation for a relativized notion of truth."-- Provided by publisher.

Contents:

1 Subjectivity, disagreement, and content 1

1.1 The goal: a truth-theoretic semantics for sentences expressing subjective judgment 1

1.2 Matters of fact and matters of opinion 4

1.3 Subjectivity as relative truth 7

1.4 Context, content, and denotation 9

1.5 Homomorphic interpretation and differentiation of content 16

2 Dismissing the easy alternatives 22

2.1 Indexical analyses 22

2.2 Quantificational analyses 31

2.3 Absolutism and ignorance 32

2.4 Expressivism 35

2.5 Metalinguistic and metacontextual conflict 38

3 Setting the syntactic and semantic stage 43

3.1 Syntactic assumptions 43

3.2 Pronouns, names, and anaphora 47

3.3 Common nouns, quantification, and binding 50

3.4 Negation and contradiction 61

3.5 Intensionality 64

4 Notes on the grammar of time and space 69

4.1 Tense 69

4.2 Spatial deixis 78

5 Basic relativist semantics 90

5.1 The judge parameter 90

5.2 Revising the grammar 94

5.3 Extension to taste expressions 98

5.4 Truth in a relativist semantics 101

5.5 Derelativization in the object language 103

6 "Hidden" and "disguised" elements 107

6.1 Phonological reduction 108

6.2 Null elements in syntax 109

6.3 Unarticulated constituents 119

6.4 Constructional indexicality 121

6.5 Sublexical and compound indexicality 123

6.6 Indexical and quantificational interpretations of hidden elements 130

6.7 Conclusion 132

7 Pragmatics of truth assessment 134

7.1 Contexts of use and parameter values 134

7.2 Contexts of assessment and parameter values 139

7.3 Adopting a stance 142

7.4 Truth assessment and the adicity of true 144

7.5 Exocentricity and indexicality 146

7.6 Acentric stances 151

8 Attitude predicates in relativist semantics 153

8.1 Stance and belief 153

8.2 Factives, relativism, and speaker commitment 158

8.3 Infinitival clauses and time reference 161

8.4 Centered attitudes and control of infinitival subjects 165

8.5 Effective centering without PRO 180

8.6 De se belief and autocentric truth assessment 190

8.7 Against non-indexical contextualism 191

9 Assertion and other speech acts 201

9.1 Assertion, norms, and portrayal as true 201

9.2 Assertion, conversation, and context change 206

9.3 Why assert? 209

9.4 Questions 211

10 Between fact and opinion 214

10.1 Aesthetic judgment and refinement of taste 214

10.2 Contingent futures 218

10.3 Epistemic modality 224

10.4 Non-taste candidates for relativism: scalar cut-offs, sufficiency, and derogation 228

10.5 Conclusion 234

11 Reliability, imagination, and the functional motivation for relativism 235

11.1 An evolutionary fable 236

11.2 Space and logical space 242

11.3 Reliability and traversable dimensions 246

11.4 Reliability-based content 250

11.5 From reliability to truth 253.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-266) and index.

ISBN:

9780199573677

0199573670

9780199573684

0199573689

OCLC:

950476084