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Competition in Persuasion / Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica.
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Gentzkow, Matthew.
- Series:
- Working Paper Series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w17436.
- NBER working paper series no. w17436
- Language:
- English
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource: illustrations (black and white);
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2011.
- Summary:
- We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders' preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.
- Notes:
- Print version record
- September 2011.
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