Minimal verificationism : on the limits of knowledge / Gordian Haas.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Haas, Gordian, author.

Series:

Deutsche Hochschulschriften. Epistemische Studien ; Band 31.

Epistemische Studien, 2198-1884 ; Band 31

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Verification (Empiricism).

Logical positivism.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (224 p.)

Place of Publication:

Boston, [Massachusetts] ; Berlin, [Germany] : De Gruyter, 2015.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Verificationism has been a hallmark of logical empiricism. According to this principle, a sentence is insignificant in a certain sense if its truth value cannot be determined. Although logical empiricists strove for decades to develop an adequate principle of verification, they failed to resolve its problems. This led to a general abandonment of the verificationist project in the early 1960's. In the last 50 years, this view has received tremendously bad press. Today it is mostly regarded as an outdated historical concept. Theories that have evolved since the abandonment of verificationism can, however, help overcome some of its key problems. More specifically, an adequate criterion of significance can be derived from a combination of modern theories of justification and belief revision, along with a formal semantics for counterfactuals. In view of these potential improvements, the abandonment of verificationism appears premature. Half a century following its decline, it might be about time to revisit this disreputable view. The author argues in favor of a weak form of verificationism. This approach could be referred to as minimal verificationism, as it involves a weakening of traditional verificationist principles in various respects while maintaining their core idea.

Contents:

Front matter

Acknowledgements

Contents

Figures and Tables

Introduction: Does This Make Nonsense to You?

1 Some Historic Formulations and Their Problems

2 More Problems Lie Ahead

3 Toward a Solution to the Problems

4 Minimal Verificationism

5 Fallibilist Theories of Justification

6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM

7 Combining Theories of Justification and Belief Revision: Judas

8 Lewis’ Semantics for Counterfactuals

9 Towards a Verifiability-Friendly Semantics for Counterfactuals

10 (Non) Concluding Remarks

References

Name Index

Subject Index

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

9781501501982

1501501984

9781501502002

150150200X

OCLC:

932011071