Is truth the primary epistemic goal? / Markus Patrick Hess.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hess, Markus Patrick.

Series:

Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ; Bd. 17.

Epistemische Studien : Schriften zue Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ; Bd. 17

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Truth--Philosophy.

Truth.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Goal (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (169 p.)

Place of Publication:

Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, 2010.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only

Contents:

Frontmatter

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments:

1. Introduction

2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal?

3. The Value of Truth

4. Requirements of the Truth Goal

5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal

6. Alternative Monism

7. The Value of Knowledge

8. Conclusion

9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism

Bibliography

Notes:

Description based upon print version of record.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

3-86838-062-0

3-11-032955-7

OCLC:

851972170