A collection of surveys on market experiments / edited by Charles Noussair and Steven Tucker.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Noussair, Charles.

Tucker, Steven.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Business.

Experimental economics.

Game theory.

Markets.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (298 pages)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Chichester, West Sussex ; Malden, Massachusetts : Wiley, 2014.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Comprised of 10 surveys by leading scholars, this collection showcases the largest and fastest growing strands of research on market behaviour in experimental economics. * Covers topics such as asset markets, contests, environmental policy, frictions, general equilibrium, labour markets, multi-unit auctions, oligopoly markets, and prediction markets * Focuses on the literature that has helped economists best understand how markets operate * Assesses the impact of developments in theory, policy, and research methods

Contents:

Intro

A Collection of Surveys on Market Experiments

CONTENTS

1 A COLLECTION OF SURVEYS ON MARKET EXPERIMENTS

References

2 EXPERIMENTAL LABOR MARKETS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND MACROECONOMIC ASPECTS

1. Introduction

2. Experimental Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

2.1 Common Features Across Experiments

2.2 Fundamental Results

2.3 Gift-Exchange Labor Markets and Policy Instruments

2.4 Robustness and Extensions of Gift-Exchange Labor Markets

2.5 Summary

3. Experimental Labor Markets in Macroeconomics and Public Finance

4. Conclusions

Notes

3 PRICE DYNAMICS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EXPERIMENTS

2. Price Dynamics in Laboratory Exchange Economies

2.1 Across-Period Dynamics

2.2 Within-Period Dynamics

3. Further Experimental GE Applications

Acknowledgements

4 OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT MILLENNIUM

2. Oligopoly Competition from a Static Perspective

2.1 Simultaneous-Move Quantity and Price Competition

2.2 Sequential-Move Games, Timing and Commitment

2.3 Innovation and Competition

2.4 Price Dispersion

3. Dynamics, (non-)Convergence, and Learning Processes

3.1 Stability and Convergence of Cournot Markets

3.2 Cycles under Price Competition

3.3 Feedback, Information and Learning Processes

4. Collusion and Policy

4.1 Tacit Collusion

4.2 Cartels and Competition Policy

4.3 Regulation

5. Concluding Remarks

5 MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS

2. Multiunit Auctions, Single-Unit Demand

2.1 Comparison of Auction Formats Motivated by Spectrum Sales

2.2 Other Single-Unit Demand Auctions

3. Multiunit Demand, No Synergies

3.1 Demand Reduction under Uniform-Price Auctions and Institutional Remedies.

3.2 Extensions to Asymmetric Bidders and Common Values

4. Synergies and Package Bidding

4.1 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions

4.2 Exposure and Threshold Problems

4.3 Comparison of Alternative Auction Mechanisms

5. Role of Specific Institutional Features

5.1 Bid Withdrawal and Eligibility Rules

5.2 Ending Rules

5.3 Jump Bidding

6. Collusion

6.1 Collusion with Explicit Communication

6.2 Tacit Collusion

7. Sequential Bidding

7.1 Auction Formats and Sequencing of Sales

7.2 Price Trends in Sequential Auctions

8. Conclusions and Open Questions

8.1 Comparison of Auction Formats and Alternative Mechanisms

8.2 Asymmetric Bidders, Entry, and Competition among Auctions

8.3 Behavioral Models of Bidding

6 OVERBIDDING AND HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR IN CONTEST EXPERIMENTS

2. A Simple Contest Model

3. Experimental Findings on Contests

4. Overbidding in Contests

4.1 Bounded Rationality

4.2 Utility of Winning

4.3 Other-Regarding Preferences

4.4 Probability Distortion

4.5 The Shape of the Payoff Function

4.6 How to Reduce Overbidding

5. Heterogeneous Behavior in Contests

5.1 Heterogeneous Preferences

5.2 Demographic Differences

5.3 Learning and Hot Hand

5.4 How to Reduce Heterogeneity

6. Discussion and Conclusion

7 ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS: WHAT DO WE LEARN FROM THE LAB?

2. Emission Trading Experiments

2.1 Trading Institutions

2.2 Uncertainty and Enforcement

2.3 Market Power

3. Other Environmental Policy Experiments

3.1 Water Markets

3.2 Conservation Auctions and Agricultural Policy

3.3 Other Market Experiments that Inform Environmental Policy

4. Conclusion and the Way Forward

References.

8 EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS WITH FRICTIONS

2. Modeling Decentralized Frictional Markets

3. A Review of Recent Experimental Work on Markets with Frictions

3.1 Peer Punishment

3.2 Monetary Exchange

3.3 Communication

4. Communication in Markets with Frictions: A New Experimental Approach

4.1 Experimental Design

4.2 Four Results

5. Discussion and Conclusions

Supporting Information

9 EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH ON ASSET PRICING

2. Early Work

3. Market Microstructure

4. Parimutuel Betting Markets

5. Participant Characteristics

5.1 Behavioral Traits

5.2 Traders' Emotional States

5.3 Trader Strategies

6. Public Information Release

7. Studies of the Capital Asset Pricing Model

8. Conclusion

10 A REVIEW OF BUBBLES AND CRASHES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS

1. Description of the Baseline Market

1.1 Market Design

1.2 Typical Price and Volume Patterns

2. Stylized Results

2.1 Trader Characteristics

2.2 Expectations

2.3 Asset-to-Cash Ratio

2.4 Short-Selling

2.5 Dividends

2.6 Fundamental Value

2.7 Endowments

2.8 Taxes and Transaction Costs

2.9 Limit Price Change Rule and Asset Holdings Cap

2.10 Derivative Instruments

2.11 Institution of Exchange

2.12 Compensation and Incentives

2.13 Social Comparison

2.14 Communication

2.15 Relative Prices in Multi-Asset Markets

3 Conclusion

11 PREDICTION MARKETS IN THE LABORATORY

1. The Success of Markets Aggregating Information

2. Comparisons of Predication Markets with Other Mechanisms for Information Aggregation

3. How Do Insiders Impact Markets?

4. Manipulation

5. Future Work

INDEX.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (ebrary, viewed December 6, 2013).

ISBN:

9781118790700

1118790707

9781118790687

1118790685

9781118790694

1118790693

OCLC:

858975637