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Beyond conceptual dualism : ontology of consciousness, mental causation, and holism in John R. Searle's philosophy of mind / Giuseppe Vicari ; guest foreword by John R. Searle ; editorial foreword by Francesc Forn i Argimon.

EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America)

Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

Ebook Central Academic Complete
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Vicari, Giuseppe.
Contributor:
Searle, John R.
Forn i Argimon, Francesc.
Series:
Value inquiry book series ; v. 196.
Value inquiry book series. Cognitive science.
Value Inquiry Book Series ; 196. Cognitive science
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Analysis (Philosophy).
Free will and determinism.
Intentionality (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (217 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Other Title:
Ontology of consciousness, mental causation, and holism in John R. Searle's philosophy of mind
Place of Publication:
Amsterdam ; New York : Rodopi, 2008.
Language Note:
English
System Details:
data file
Summary:
This book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle’s philosophy of mind. Searle’s view of mind, as a set of subjective and biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature qua mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.
Contents:
Preliminary Material
INTRODUCTION
PROBLEMS AND THEORIES: THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE
BIOLOGICAL NATURALISM: A NATURALISTIC AND NON-REDUCTIVE ONTOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
HOLISM AND MENTAL CAUSATION IN THE THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY
JOHN SEARLE AND CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE: HOLISM, MENTAL CAUSATION, AND THE ROOTS OF SUBJECTIVITY
CONCLUSION
WORKS CITED
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
INDEX
VIBS.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [165]-174) and index.
ISBN:
94-012-0633-3
1-4356-9540-2
OCLC:
714567244
Publisher Number:
10.1163/9789401206334 DOI

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