Learning from six philosophers : Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Volume 2 / Jonathan Bennett.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Bennett, Jonathan, 1930-

Series:

Learning from Six Philosophers (2 Volumes) ; v2

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy, Modern--17th century.

Philosophy, Modern.

Philosophy, Modern--18th century.

Modality (Logic).

Physical Description:

1 online resource (550 pages)

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, [2001]

Summary:

In this work, Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. His chief focus is on the words they wrote.

Contents:

VOLUME 2

Preface to Volume 2

Abbreviations

CHAPTER 21: LOCKEAN IDEAS, OVERVIEW AND FOUNDATIONS

154. Locke's explanation of the term 'idea'

155. The roles played by Lockean ideas

156. How ideas represent: two theories

157. A third theory

158. Against reification

159. Locke and the reification of ideas

CHAPTER 22: LOCKEAN IDEAS, SOME DETAILS

160. Are all Lockean ideas images?

161. Locke's two accounts of abstract ideas

162. Berkeley's first attack on abstract ideas

163. Can images be abstract?

164. Berkeley's second attack

165. Hume's variant on it

166. Abstract ideas and complex ideas

167. Ideas and concepts

168. Ideas and qualities

169. Explaining the idea/quality conflation

CHAPTER 23: KNOWLEDGE OF NECESSITY

170. Innate knowledge: introduction

171. Dispositional innate knowledge

172. Leibniz on dispositional innatism

173. Locke on modal discovery: the relevance problem

174. Other relations

175. Locke on modal discovery: the necessity problem

176. Leibniz's first modal epistemology

177. Leibniz's second modal epistemology

178. Leibniz's relevance problem

179. Innately possessed ideas

CHAPTER 24: DESCARTES'S THEORY OF MODALITY

180. Descartes's voluntarism about modal truths

181. The two parts of Descartes's voluntarism: the tandem puzzle

182. Omnipotence and small achievements

183. Subjective and objective: the bootstraps problem

184. Theorizing about the basis of modality: the libertinism threat

185. Descartes's handling of the threat

186. Can Descartes's God deceive?

CHAPTER 25: SECONDARY QUALITIES

187. Locke's corpuscularianism

188. The corpuscularian thesis about what secondary qualities are

189. Why the central thesis is true

190. A diffference of kind.

191. How Locke defends the central thesis

192. How the central thesis solves the problem

193. The 'no resemblance' thesis

194. Is the central thesis a semantic one?

CHAPTER 26: LOCKE ON ESSENCES

195. Essences of individuals

196. The first opinion about real essences

197. The second opinion about real essences

198. How we classify

199. Guessing at real essences

200. Meanings and essences

201. The nature and source of Locke's failure

202. Essences and universals

CHAPTER 27: SUBSTANCE IN LOCKE

203. The substratum theory

204. Locke's attitude to it

205. How to avoid Locke's impasse

206. Ayers's interpretation of 'substance' in Locke

207. Two exegetical problems

CHAPTER 28: BERKELEY AGAINST MATERIALISM

208. Foundationalism

209. Descartes on the existence of matter

210. Locke on the existence of matter

211. Berkeley's first attack: materialism clashes with common sense

212. Second attack: materialism is not supported by evidence

213. Third attack: materialism is certainly false

214. The occasionalist escape

215. Fourth attack: materialism is conceptually defective

CHAPTER 29: BERKELEY'S USES OF LOCKE'S WORK

216. Why Berkeley cares about abstract ideas

217. What Berkeley says about secondary qualities

218. What Berkeley says about substratum substance

CHAPTER 30: BERKELEY ON SPIRITS

219. Berkeley on 'spirit'

220. Berkeley against solipsism

221. Only spirits can be causes

222. Berkeley's natural theology

223. Human agency

224. Other people

CHAPTER 31: BERKELEIAN SENSIBLE THINGS

225. Each sensible thing is a collection of ideas

226. Problems with collections

227. Berkeley's disrespect towards 'sensible thing'

228. The vulgar sense of 'same'

229. The continuity of sensible things

230. The continuity argument.

231. Idealism and phenomenalism

232. Was Berkeley a phenomenalist?

233. Phenomenalism and the creation

234. Why was Berkeley not a phenomenalist?

CHAPTER 32: HUME'S 'IDEAS'

235. Approaching Hume

236. What kind of philosopher was Hume?

237. A case-study: the belief in body

238. The idea/impression line: distractions

239. The idea/impression line: what it is

240. An odd problem

241. Memory

242. The line between simple and complex ideas

243. The copy thesis: problems

244. The copy thesis: a triple revision

245. The missing shade of blue

246. Passion and reflection

CHAPTER 33: HUME AND BELIEF

247. Propositional thoughts

248. Beliefs and other propositional thoughts

249. Looking for an account of belief

250. Hume's account of belief

251. Belief: feeling versus intellect

CHAPTER 34: SOME HUMEAN DOCTRINE ABOUT RELATIONS

252. The association of ideas: preliminaries

253. Three of the four natural relations

254. The fourth relation: causation

255. The importance of the thesis in Hume's thought

256. Seven kinds of relations

257. Two dichotomies

CHAPTER 35: HUME ON CAUSATION, NEGATIVELY

258. Observing particular cause-effect pairs

259. The gateway to the neighbouring fields

260. The status of the principle of universal causation

261. Hume's influential error about distinctness of ideas

262. Steering around it

263. The point of the question about universal causation

264. Causal inferences from memory and sensory experience

265. Causation and absolute necessity

266. The Lockean inference to power

267. Four of Hume's objections to the Lockean inference

268. A further objection

CHAPTER 36: HUME ON CAUSATION, POSITIVELY

269. The causes of causal inferences

270. Hume's best account of causation.

271. The elusiveness of impressions of compulsion

272. The absurdity of 'impression of compulsion'

273. Was Hume a sceptic about causation?

274. The great objection to the 'Humean view of causation'

275. Did Hume accept the 'Humean view of causation'?

CHAPTER 37: HUME ON THE EXISTENCE OF BODIES

276. The project in Treatise I.iv.2

277. The role of the senses

278. The role of reason

279. Imagination: creaking and contradiction

280. Imagination: oceans and explanation

281. The 'what genus?' question

282. Hume's 'system': the identity move

283. Hume's 'system': the remainder

284. What is wrong with The Belief

CHAPTER 38: REASON

285. Reasoning in man and beast

286. Demonstrative reasoning

287. A sceptical attack on reason: preliminaries

288. A sceptical attack on reason: the argument

289. How Hume responds to the attack

290. The real importance of Treatise iv.1

CHAPTER 39: LOCKE ON DIACHRONIC IDENTITY-JUDGEMENTS

291. Atoms and aggregates of them

292. Organisms

293. Relative identity

294. 'Same man'

295. Persons

296. Persons and substances

297. Personal identity

298. Locke's analysis is too weak

299. Locke's analysis is too strong

300. People as animals

301. 'A forensic concept'

302. Same person, same substance?

CHAPTER 40: HUME AND LEIBNIZ ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

303. Diachronic identity statements: Hume's approach and Locke's

304. Optimal diachronic identity statements

305. Hume tries to explain some of Locke's results

306. Hume on personal identity: negative

307. Hume on personal identity: positive

308. Pears on omitting the body

309. Hume's recantation

310. Coda: Hume and Berkeley on the passage of time

311. Leibniz on what a substance is

312. Leibniz and Hume compared

Bibliography

Index of Persons.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and indexes.

Description based on print version record.

ISBN:

0-19-159706-6