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Locke on personal identity : consciousness and concernment / Galen Strawson.

De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 Available online

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Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Strawson, Galen, author.
Contributor:
Strawson, Galen.
Series:
Princeton monographs in philosophy.
Princeton monographs in philosophy
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Locke, John, 1632-1704. Of identity and diversity.
Locke, John.
Identity (Psychology).
Physical Description:
1 online resource (278 p.)
Edition:
Updated edition with a New Preface
Place of Publication:
Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, [2011]
Language Note:
English
Summary:
John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves-yet it is widely thought to be wrong. In this book, Galen Strawson argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. Strawson argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word "person" as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like "human being." In actuality, Locke uses "person" primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word "conscious." When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
Contents:
Front matter
Contents
Preface
Chapter One. Introduction
Chapter Two. "Person"
Chapter Three. "Person . . . is a forensic term"
Chapter Four. Concernment
Chapter Five. Consciousness
Chapter Six. "Consciousness . . . is inseparable from thinking"
Chapter Seven. "From the inside"
Chapter Eight. "Person"-Locke's Definition
Chapter Nine. Consciousness Is Not Memory
Chapter Ten. Personal Identity
Chapter Eleven. Psychological Connectedness
Chapter Twelve. Transition (Butler Dismissed)
Chapter Thirteen. " But next . . . ": Personal Identity without Substantial Continuity
Chapter Fourteen. "And therefore . . . ": [I]-transfers, [Ag]-transfers, [P]-transfers
Chapter Fifteen. "A fatal error of theirs"
Chapter Sixteen. A Fatal Error of Locke's?
Chapter Seventeen. Circularity?
Chapter Eighteen. The Distinction between [P] and [S]
Chapter Nineteen. Concernment and Repentance
Chapter Twenty. Conclusion
Postface
Appendix One. "Of Identity and Diversity" An Essay concerning Human Understanding / Locke, John
Appendix Two. A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity / Law, Edmund
References
Index
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Description based on print version record.
ISBN:
9786613227461
9781400851843
140085184X
9781283227469
1283227460
9781400840229
1400840228
OCLC:
756280837

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