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The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises / Luc Laeven, Fabian Valencia.

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Format:
Book
Government document
Author/Creator:
Laeven, Luc.
Contributor:
Valencia, Fabian.
Series:
IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ; No. 2008/250
IMF working paper ; WP/08/250
IMF Working Papers
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Bank failures.
Financial crises.
Moral hazard.
Deposit insurance.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (45 pages) : illustrations, tables.
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2008.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.
Contents:
Intro
Contents
I. Introduction
II. Country Experiences
III. Effectiveness of Blanket Guarantees
A. Empirical Analysis
IV. The Costs of Using Blanket Guarantees
V. Policy Implications
VI. Conclusions
Tables
1. Selected Blanket Guarantee Episodes
2. Selected Bank-Specific Guarantee Announcements
3. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Liquidity Support
4. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effects of Guarantees on Liquidity Support
5. Impact of Blanket Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities
6. Short-Term and Medium-Term Effect of Guarantees on Foreign Liabilities
7. Blanket Guarantee and Extensive Liquidity Support
8. Blanket Guarantees, Crisis Intensity, and Fiscal Costs
A1. Sequence of Events in Selected Crisis Episodes
A2. IMF Programs and Bank Restructuring Policies
Figures
1. Effectiveness of Depositors' Guarantees in Selected Countries
2. Fiscal Costs and Blanket Guarantees
3. Crisis Intensity and Blanket Guarantees
References.
Notes:
Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF front page (ebrary, viewed February 26, 2014).
ISBN:
9786612842016
9781462393121
1462393128
9781282842014
1282842013
9781451871081
1451871082
9781452745039
145274503X
OCLC:
460638675

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