The Nixon Administration and the Middle East peace process, 1969-1973 : from the Rogers Plan to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War / Boaz Vanetik, Zaki Shalom ; translated from Hebrew by Guy Solomon.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Vanetik, Boaz.

Contributor:

Shalom, Zaki.

Solomon, Guy.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Israel-Arab War, 1973--Causes.

Israel-Arab War, 1973.

United States--Foreign relations--Israel.

United States.

Israel--Foreign relations--United States.

Israel.

United States--Foreign relations--Egypt.

Egypt--Foreign relations--United States.

Egypt.

United States--Foreign relations--1969-1974.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (309 p.)

Place of Publication:

Brighton : Sussex Academic Press, 2013.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

The Yom Kippur War was a watershed moment in Israeli society and a national trauma whose wounds have yet to heal some four decades later. In the years following the war many studies addressed the internal and international political background prior to the war, attempting to determine causes and steps by political players and parties in Israel, Egypt and the United States. But to date there has been no comprehensive study based on archival materials and other primary sources. Classified documents from that period have recently become available and it is now possible to examine in depth a crucial period in Middle East history generally and Israeli history in particular. The authors provide a penetrating and insightful viewpoint on the question that lies at the heart of the Israeli polity and military: Was an opportunity missed to prevent the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War? The book provides surprising answers to long-standing issues: How did National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, succeed in torpedoing the efforts of the State Department to bring about an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1971?; Would that agreement have allowed Israel to hold on to most of the Sinai Peninsula for many years and at the same time avert the outbreak of the war; Did Golda Meir reject any diplomatic initiative that came up for discussion in the years preceding the war?; Was the White House's Middle East policy throughout 1973 a catalyst for war breaking out?

Contents:

Part 1. The twilight of the Nasser Regime: 1967-1970

The Middle East arena following the Six Day War

The Johnson Administration's attempts to promote a settlement between Israel and Egypt in 1968

The "two-power talks" (US-USSR): March-September 1969

The First Rogers Plan, October-December 1969

The Rogers initiative for a ceasefire in the Suez Canal, June 1970, part 1

The Rogers initiative for a ceasefire in the Suez Canal, June 1970, part 2

The crisis in Jordan (September 1970) and its implications

Part 2. "The stalemate policy": 1971-1972

Sadat replaces Nasser, Cairo and Washington begin moving closer

Attempts to arrange an interim agreement in the Suez Canal: February 1971

Ongoing efforts to reach an interim Israeli-Egyptian agreement

The unofficial death of the Rogers Plan

Part 3. The run up to the Yom Kippur War: Autumn 1972-October 1973

Reinforcing the status quo in the region

Complacency in the shadow of continued diplomatic stalemate

Summary and conclusions.

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781782840756

1782840753

9781782840732

1782840737

OCLC:

849918621