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Virtue epistemology : motivation and knowledge / Stephen Napier.

EBSCOhost Academic eBook Collection (North America) Available online

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Napier, Stephen E.
Series:
Continuum studies in philosophy.
Continuum studies in philosophy
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Virtue epistemology.
Knowledge, Theory of.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (183 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
London ; New York : Continuum, c2008.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
Contemporary epistemology debates have largely been occupied with formulating a definition of knowledge that is immune to any counterexample. To date, no definition has been able to escape unscathed. Moving away from debates about definitions, Virtue Epistemology shows what conditions are essential for knowledge and applies this account to different domains. It proposes that agents must be motivated correctly to acquire knowledge, even in the case of perception. Stephen Napier examines closely the empirical research in cognitive science and moral psychology to build an account of knowledge whe
Contents:
Introduction
Competing conceptions of a cognitive virtue
A virtue account of perception
A virtue account of memory
Testimony and cognitive virtue
Moral expertise : the role of cognitive virtues in generating knowledge
Cognitive virtue, divine hiddenness, and reasonable belief or nonbelief.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. [164]-172) and index.
ISBN:
9786612875335
9781282875333
1282875337
9781441160539
1441160531
OCLC:
680017787

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