My Account Log in

1 option

Precaution incentives in accident settings / by Tim Friehe.

Ebook Central Academic Complete Available online

View online
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Friehe, Tim.
Series:
Gabler Edition Wissenschaft. Okonomische Analyse des Rechts.
Gabler Edition Wissenschaft. Okonomische Analyse des Rechts
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Law and economics.
Accident law.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (199 p.)
Edition:
1st ed. 2008.
Place of Publication:
Wiesbaden : Gabler, 2008.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
One central function of tort law is the inducement of precaution incentives. This is particularly welcome in settings in which the internalization of interdependencies between individuals relating to care and expected harm would otherwise not take effect due to high transaction costs broadly conceived, accident settings being a prime example. Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. Incentives to take precaution, which affect the accident probability and/or the magnitude of the harm in the event of an accident, are of primary interest in this context. After providing an extensive review of the literature relating to the economic analysis of tort law, the author goes on to discuss the consequences of victims with different harm levels. In particular, using average harm as a compensation measure in order to save administrative costs is considered and a scheme to make the revelation of the individual harm level incentive-compatible is devised. Furthermore, the book contributes to the ongoing discussion on the effects of judgment proofness and the distinction between unilateral harm and bilateral harm accidents. Finally, the author highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law.
Contents:
The Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes
On the Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law
On the Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability
Screening Accident Victims
A Note on Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion
On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty
On Avoidance Activities After Accidents
Conclusion.
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN:
3-8349-8127-3
OCLC:
317883286

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Library Catalog Using Articles+ Library Account