Brute rationality : normativity and human action / Joshua Gert.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gert, Joshua, author.

Series:

Cambridge studies in philosophy.

Cambridge studies in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Normativity (Ethics).

Decision making--Moral and ethical aspects.

Decision making.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).

Place of Publication:

Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.

Contents:

What would an adequate theory of rationality be like?

Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons

The criticism from internalism about practical reasons

A functional role analysis of reasons

Accounting for our actual normative judgments

Fitting the view into the contemporary debate

Two concepts of rationality

Internalism and different kinds of reasons

Brute rationality.

Notes:

Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-225) and index.

ISBN:

1-107-14913-4

1-280-51612-7

0-511-21479-0

0-511-21658-0

0-511-21121-X

0-511-31536-8

0-511-48708-8

0-511-21298-4

OCLC:

171139012