Atomic assistance : how "atoms for peace" programs cause nuclear insecurity / Matthew Fuhrmann.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fuhrmann, Matthew, 1980-

Series:

Cornell studies in security affairs.

Cornell studies in security affairs

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Nuclear nonproliferation--International cooperation.

Nuclear nonproliferation.

Nuclear industry--International cooperation.

Nuclear industry.

Technology transfer--International cooperation.

Technology transfer.

Technical assistance--International cooperation.

Technical assistance.

Security, International.

Physical Description:

1 online resource (340 p.)

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2012.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Nuclear technology is dual use in nature, meaning that it can be used to produce nuclear energy or to build nuclear weapons. Despite security concerns about proliferation, the United States and other nuclear nations have regularly shared with other countries nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge for peaceful purposes. In Atomic Assistance, Matthew Fuhrmann argues that governments use peaceful nuclear assistance as a tool of economic statecraft. Nuclear suppliers hope that they can reap the benefits of foreign aid-improving relationships with their allies, limiting the influence of their adversaries, enhancing their energy security by gaining favorable access to oil supplies-without undermining their security. By providing peaceful nuclear assistance, however, countries inadvertently help spread nuclear weapons. Fuhrmann draws on several cases of "Atoms for Peace," including U.S. civilian nuclear assistance to Iran from 1957 to 1979; Soviet aid to Libya from 1975 to 1986; French, Italian, and Brazilian nuclear exports to Iraq from 1975 to 1981; and U.S. nuclear cooperation with India from 2001 to 2008. He also explores decision making in countries such as Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Syria to determine why states began (or did not begin) nuclear weapons programs and why some programs succeeded while others failed. Fuhrmann concludes that, on average, countries receiving higher levels of peaceful nuclear assistance are more likely to pursue and acquire the bomb-especially if they experience an international crisis after receiving aid.

Contents:

Frontmatter

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Preface and Acknowledgments

List of Abbreviations

Introduction: Unintended Consequences in International Politics

1. Definitions and Patterns of Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

Part I. Atoms for Peace

2. Economic Statecraft and Atoms for Peace: A Theory of Peaceful Nuclear Assistance

3. The Historical Record: A First Cut

4. Nuclear Arms and Influence: Assisting India, Iran, and Libya

5. The Thirst for Oil and Other Motives: Nine Puzzling Cases of Assistance

6. Oil for Peaceful Nuclear Assistance?

Part II. Atoms for War

7. Spreading Temptation: Why Nuclear Export Strategies Backfire

8. Who Builds Bombs? How Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Facilitates the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

9. Have International Institutions Made the World Safer?

Conclusion: What Peaceful Nuclear Assistance Teaches Us about International Relations

Notes

Index

Notes:

Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780801465314

0801465311

9781322503578

1322503575

9780801465758

0801465753

OCLC:

808344445