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Cooperative extensions of the Bayesian game / Tatsuro Ichiishi, Akira Yamazaki.

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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Ichiishi, Tatsuro.
Contributor:
Yamazaki, Akira, 1942-
Series:
Series on mathematical economics and game theory ; v. 3.
Series on mathematical economics and game theory ; v. 3
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Game theory.
Bayesian statistical decision theory.
Physical Description:
1 online resource (256 p.)
Edition:
1st ed.
Place of Publication:
New Jersey : World Scientific, c2006.
Language Note:
English
Summary:
This is the very first comprehensive monograph in a burgeoning, new research area - the theory of cooperative game with incomplete information with emphasis on the solution concept of Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium that encompasses the concept of the Bayesian incentive compatible core. Built upon the concepts and techniques in the classical static cooperative game theory and in the non-cooperative Bayesian game theory, the theory constructs and analyzes in part the powerful n-person game-theoretical model characterized by coordinated strategy-choice with individualistic ince
Contents:
""Contents ""; ""Preface ""; ""I BASIC INGREDIENTS ""; ""1 Introduction ""; ""2 Cooperative Extension of the Bayesian Game ""; ""2.1 Formal Model ""; ""2.2 Examples ""; ""2.3 Two Approaches to Formulate Incomplete Information ""; ""3 Measurability as Feasibility of Individual Actions ""
""3.1 General Case """"3.2 Private Information Case Fully Pooled Information Case ""; ""4 Bayesian Incentive Compatibility as Feasibility of Execution of Contracts ""; ""4.1 Private Information Case ""; ""4.2 Mediator-Based Approach ""; ""4.3 Communication Plan as a Part of a Strategy ""
""II SOLUTIONS INFORMATION REVELATION """"5 Descriptive Solution Concepts ""; ""5.1 Interim Solution Concepts ""; ""5.2 Ex Ante Solution Concepts ""; ""5.3 Other Interactive Modes ""; ""5.4 Coexistence of Coalitions ""; ""6 Normative Solution Concepts ""; ""6.1 Interim Efficiency Concepts ""
""6.2 Coexistence of Coalitions """"7 Comparisons of Several Core Concepts ""; ""7.1 Fine Core and Ex Post Core ""; ""7.2 Private Measurability and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility ""; ""8 Existence ""; ""8.1 Interim Solutions ""; ""8.2 Ex Ante Solutions ""; ""8.A Appendix to Chapter 8 ""
""9 Approaches to Information Revelation """"9.1 By Contract Execution ""; ""9.2 By Contract Execution: A Profit-Center Game with Incomplete Information ""; ""9.3 By Choosing a Contract ""; ""9.4 Update of Interim Probabilities ""
""9.5 By Credible Transmission of Information During the Contract Negotiation ""
Notes:
Description based upon print version of record.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-233) and index.
ISBN:
9786611919689
9781281919687
1281919683
9789812774774
9812774777
OCLC:
879023801

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