Confronting Iraq : U.S. policy and the use of force since the Gulf War / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Byman, Daniel, 1967-

Contributor:

Waxman, Matthew C., 1972-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States--Foreign relations--Iraq.

United States.

Iraq--Foreign relations--United States.

Iraq.

United States--Foreign relations--1989-.

United States--Military policy.

Physical Description:

xxiii, 101 p.

Edition:

1st ed.

Place of Publication:

Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2000.

Language Note:

English

Summary:

Although Iraq remains hostile to the United States, Baghdad has repeatedly compromised, and at times caved, in response to U.S. pressure and threats. An analysis of attempts to coerce Iraq since Desert Storm reveals that military strikes and other forms of pressure that threatened Saddam Husayn's relationship with his power base proved effective at forcing concessions from the Iraqi regime. When coercing Saddam or other foes, U.S. policymakers should design a strategy around the adversary's center of gravity while seeking to neutralize adversary efforts to counter-coerce the United States and appreciating the policy constraints imposed by domestic politics and international alliances.

Contents:

PREFACE

FIGURES

SUMMARY

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

IRAQ AS AN ADVERSARY

THE HISTORICAL RECORD

IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES AND COUNTERMOVES

IMPLICATIONS FOR COERCION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

INTRODUCTION

UNDERSTANDING COERCION

DEFINING COERCION

DIFFICULTIES IN DISTINGUISHING COMPELLENCE FROM DETERRENCE

COERCION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

THE UNCERTAIN MEANING OF "SUCCESS"

HOW SADDAM STAYS IN POWER

Security and Regime Protection Forces

Political Techniques

IRAQ'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

SADDAM'S SHIFTING STRATEGY

Saddam as an Adversary: A Cagey Foe or Foolish Thug?

U.S. OBJECTIVES, OPTIONS, ASSUMPTIONS

ANALYTIC ASSUMPTIONS

CONTAINING IRAQI AGGRESSION

PREVENTING NBC BUILDUP

TOPPLING SADDAM'S REGIME

PRESERVING REGIONAL STABILITY

CONSTRAINTS ON THE UNITED STATES

Fear of Iraqi Fragmentation

Discomfort with Sanctions

Preserving an International Alliance

Humanitarian Ambivalence

Domestic Limits to Any Concessions

ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: THE HISTORICAL RECORD

ESTABLISHING UNSCOM INSPECTIONS (1991)

CREATING A KURDISH SAFE HAVEN (1991-1992)

ESTABLISHING A SOUTHERN NO-FLY ZONE (AUGUST 1992- PRESENT)

RESPONDING TO INSPECTION AND NO-FLY ZONE STANDOFFS (DECEMBER 1992- JANUARY 1993)

DETERRING AN INVASION OF KUWAIT (1994)

PUNISHING THE IRAQI THRUST INTO NORTHERN IRAQ (1996)

HALTING DEFIANCE OF UNSCOM (1997-1998)

FORCING COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCOM (OPERATION DESERT FOX, DECEMBER 1998)

THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF CONFRONTATION

ATTEMPTS TO COERCE IRAQ: A SCORECARD

U.S. POLICY TRADEOFFS AND GULF SECURITY

IRAQ'S VULNERABILITIES: AN ASSESSMENT

IRAQI PRESSURE POINTS

WHAT IRAQ IS NOT SENSITIVE TO

IRAQI COUNTERMOVES TO OFFSET VULNERABILITIES

RECOGNIZING ADVERSARY CENTERS OF GRAVITY.

COERCION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS

UNDERSTANDING WHAT CANNOT BE AFFECTED

INTEGRATING COERCIVE THREATS INTO LONG-TERM POLICY

RECOGNIZING OUR OWN LIMITS

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Notes:

"MR-1146-OSD."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-101).

ISBN:

0-8330-3253-4

0-585-38352-9

OCLC:

48183002